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This paper uses a field experiment to test whether intrahousehold heterogeneity in discount
factors leads to inefficient strategic savings behavior. I gave married couples in rural Kenya
the opportunity to open both joint and individual bank accounts at randomly assigned interest
rates. I also directly elicited discount factors for all individuals in the experiment. Couples
who are well matched on discount factors are less likely to use costly individual accounts
and respond robustly to relative rates of return between accounts, while their poorly matched
peers do not. Consequently, poorly matched couples forgo significantly more potential interest
earnings on their savings.
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1 Introduction
Members of the same household generally have different preferences and priorities – consequently,
households must decide how to aggregate these preferences when allocating resources across mem-
bers and over time. Moreover, it is clear that individuals actively advocate for their own preferences
during the decision making process, since shifts in individual bargaining power translate into shifts
in allocations (Lundberg et al. 1997; Chiappori et al. 2002; Duflo 2003; Bobonis 2009). These
observations give rise to a natural set of questions: does preference heterogeneity ever lead indi-
viduals to take costly action to manipulate intrahousehold resource allocations? If so, how big are
the resulting distortions? This is especially relevant for understanding households’ intertemporal
choices. While most studies that focus on static choices (e.g. what to consume) cannot reject the
null of efficient households, most studies that focus on dynamic choices (e.g. savings and mu-
tual insurance) reject efficiency.1 While this result is well established, the causes of intertemporal
inefficiency remain poorly understood.
This paper investigates these causes by using a field experiment conducted in rural Kenya to
test whether heterogeneity in discount factors is associated with inefficiency in a fundamental in-
tertemporal choice: savings behavior. When designing this study I chose to focus on heterogeneity
in discount factors (rather than other aspects of preference heterogeneity) for two reasons. First,
the empirical literature supporting static efficiency suggests that households do not have difficulty
reconciling heterogeneous preferences over what to consume. It is therefore intuitive to turn to het-
erogeneity in intertemporal preferences as a driver of inefficient intertemporal behavior. Second,
there is a strong theoretical justification for focusing on the difficulties associated with aggregating
preferences with differing discount factors.2 However this paper is, to my knowledge, the first to
assess the implications of this heterogeneity empirically (a novel feature of the experiment is that it
allows me to size the magnitude of the savings inefficiency), and one of few papers that explicitly
focuses on the consequences of discount factor heterogeneity within the household.3 Moreover,
the application to savings is particularly important in developing country contexts, where individ-
uals often make use of costly, secure savings devices even when lower cost alternatives appear to
1This point is made by Chiappori and Donni (2009), who also provide a summary of the empirical evidence.
A partial selection of papers finding evidence of efficient intrahousehold resource allocation include Browning and
Chiappori (1998), Chiappori et al. (2002), Rangel and Thomas (2005), and Bobonis (2009). Studies finding evidence
of inefficiency include Udry (1996), Duflo and Udry (2004), Mazzocco (2007), de Mel et al. (2009), and Robinson
(2011).
2See, e.g. Marglin 1963; Feldstein 1964; Browning 2000; Caplin and Leahy 2004; Gollier and Zeckhauser 2005;
Jackson and Yariv 2010; Zuber 2010.
3An important exception is Browning (2000). However, in his model allocations are always Pareto efficient be-
cause all savings devices offer the same rate of return and carry no transaction costs. Difficulties posed by intrahouse-
hold discount factor heterogeneity are also discussed by, but not the main focus of, Bernheim (1999) and Chiappori and
Donni (2009). Mazzocco (2007) writes a baseline model of intrahousehold decision making that allows for differing
discount factors, but assumes this away in order to perform Euler-equation based tests of intertemporal efficiency.
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be available (Collins et al. 2009; Karlan and Morduch 2010).
This paper’s central premise is that when spouses do not agree about the time path of con-
sumption, they may take costly action to manipulate outcomes in their favor. This is easy to see
with a simple example: imagine the savings problem of a patient wife paired with an impatient
husband. The wife can save in either a joint bank account that she shares with her spouse, or an
individual account. She knows that if she deposits funds into the joint account, her husband, who
only cares about the present, will simply withdraw all her savings and spend the funds on current
consumption. However, if she saves in her individual account (which her husband cannot access),
she is guaranteed that her savings will be preserved for the next period. In this context, the wife
may choose to save individually even if the joint account offers a much higher rate of return. Or
put another way, heterogeneity in intertemporal preferences may compel the wife to make costly
strategic savings choices.
I formalize this idea using a simple model of non-cooperative household savings behavior that
incorporates heterogeneity in time preferences. The model predicts that losses due to strategic
behavior will increase with preference heterogeneity. The model also allows me to characterize
efficient savings choices in an environment that mimics my experimental context, and to identify
cases where individual bank account use should increase with preference heterogeneity.
I test these predictions with a field experiment, which I conducted in Western Kenya in the
Summer of 2009. I gave 598 married couples the opportunity to open three savings accounts
(two individual, one joint) bearing randomly assigned interest rates. These interest rates were
substantially higher than those available on the market at the time. An innovative feature of the
experiment is that it created random variation in relative rates of return between accounts, even
conditional on an account’s own interest rate. This provides a clear test of efficient investment:
the household should always choose to save in the account that offers the highest rate of return. I
also asked each respondent in the experiment a battery of questions to directly elicit estimates of
discount factors, which I use to calculate measures of intrahousehold heterogeneity.
In practice, I find a substantial amount of heterogeneity in elicited discount factors – the median
couple’s estimated discount factors are 0.5 standard deviations apart. Moreover, I find that couples
who are “well matched” in terms of discount factors (i.e. above-median in match quality) robustly
respond to relative rates of return in a manner consistent with efficient investment. In contrast,
poorly matched couples are completely insensitive to relative rates of return and tend to make
especially heavy use of individual accounts. I also reject that the responses of well and poorly
matched couples are the same. These differences in behavior have financial consequences for
poorly matched couples – I exploit the design of the field experiment to calculate forgone interest
earnings by match quality and find that poorly matched couples leave at least 58 percent more
interest on the table.
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The above results suggest that spousal conflict over how much to save can give rise to inef-
ficient savings behavior. However, costly individual accounts may also be valuable because they
can be used to hide resources from spouses. I designed the experiment to explicitly address this
alternative theory and to assess whether the main results are robust to accounting for intrahouse-
hold information sharing. I find evidence that information matters – households in which spouses
are poorly informed about one another’s finances at baseline are more likely to choose individual
accounts and less likely to consent to a randomized information sharing treatment. However, these
concerns are unrelated to the initial findings regarding preference heterogeneity – well matched
couples have no better information flows than poorly matched couples, and the main results are
unchanged when accounting for intrahousehold information sharing.
Ideally, the experiment would have randomly assigned discount factors to individuals in cou-
ples. This is, of course, not feasible, so much of the analysis relies on heterogeneous treatment
effects. It is important to note that I pre-specified the theoretical framework, my focus on het-
erogeneity in discount factors, and the associated heterogeneous treatment effects before imple-
menting the experiment or undertaking any data analysis.4 That said, even though the results are
very robust to including controls for observable characteristics, one can never completely rule out
the hypothesis that the results are actually driven by unobservables that are correlated with dis-
count factor heterogeneity. This paper also requires the external validity caveat common to many
field experiments – the couples in my sample reside in a small number of communities in West-
ern Kenya, so additional research would be needed to verify whether preference heterogeneity has
similar consequences in other countries and contexts.
The most important contribution of this paper is to shed light on the nature of intertemporal
household decision making and the barriers that households face to allocating resources efficiently.
Overall, the results are inconsistent with intertemporal efficiency and support the hypothesis that
individuals choose savings levels non-cooperatively. However, the results also underscore that not
all couples bear substantial efficiency losses – indeed, when couples have similar rates of time
preference, they respond robustly to relative rates of return on savings accounts. This suggests that
some of the differences observed in household efficiency across different studies and geographical
contexts could be due to marriage markets and the quality of matches that they produce.
This paper also contributes to a growing literature that studies savings and investment in de-
veloping countries. Specifically, recent research indicates that individuals prefer to use costly but
secure informal savings devices over less costly, less secure alternatives (such as saving at home)
in order to protect resources from other members of the household, especially spouses (Anderson
4Documents detailing this plan were drafted in May and August of 2009 and are archived in the J-PAL hypoth-
esis registry. These documents can be downloaded here: https://sites.google.com/site/sschaner/home/
Preanalysis.zip?attredirects=0&d=1
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and Baland 2002).5 My results provide a rationale for this behavior and suggest that preference
heterogeneity plays a key role in determining how, and how efficiently, people save. Moreover,
many households in developing countries engage in entrepreneurial activities – for these house-
holds, business investment is an important tool for transferring resources over time. Seen in this
light, this paper’s insights are also relevant for understanding the widely noted heterogeneity in
returns to household-run microenterprises (McKenzie and Woodruff 2008; de Mel et al. 2009;
Fafchamps et al. 2012).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops the theoretical framework
that I use to structure the empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the experimental design, Section 4
presents main results, Section 5 extends the analysis to account for hidden information, Section 6
discusses other alternative explanations, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework and Testable Predictions
2.1 Economic Environment and Decision Structure
This section develops a simple model to (i) illustrate how heterogeneity in time preferences can
generate inefficient strategic savings behavior and (ii) derive a series of testable implications that I
take to the data in Section 4. I model a household comprised of two agents (i.e. spouses), A and B.
To focus on strategic behavior stemming from differences in savings motives, I assume that both
spouses have identical utility functions defined over a single public consumption good, c (this way
the only choice that the household must make is when to consume).6 The spouses live in a two
period world and exponentially discount per-period utility. The individual discount factor for agent
i is δi and I assume that the per-period utility function u(·) is continuous, increasing, and concave
with u′ (c)→ ∞ as c→ 0.
At the beginning of each period the household receives a deterministic endowment, yt , which
can be consumed or saved (I assume there is no borrowing in this economy).7 Households have
access to three different savings technologies: (1) a public (i.e. joint) bank account, which yields
rate of return RJ , (2) a private (i.e. individual) bank account for agent A, which yields rate of
return RA, and (3) a private bank account for agent B, which yields rate of return RB. What makes
5Of course, there are other reasons why individuals may value informal savings devices. Other leading drivers of
demand include a need to protect savings from oneself (as in Ashraf et al. 2006) and a need to protect savings from
appropriation by members of the community (as in Baland et al. 2007; Jakiela and Ozier 2012).
6In practice, households must contend with both heterogeneity in intertemporal preferences and heterogeneity in
what to consume in a given period. I discuss this issue in subsection 2.3.
7Alternatively, one could assume that the husband and wife receive separate endowments that they have exclusive
access to. As long as savings constraints do not bind (i.e. an individual never saves his or her entire endowment), the
analysis would be unchanged.
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the "public" account public is that any member of the household can deposit and withdraw funds.
In contrast, only the owner of a "private" account can access that account to make deposits and
withdrawals.
I also assume that accounts have time and travel costs associated with them, which I refer to as
"banking costs". Specifically, an individual must pay a banking cost of b > 0 every time he or she
travels to the bank to transact. This is meant to capture the fact that financial markets in developing
countries are often characterized by very high transaction costs (Karlan and Morduch 2010) – this
is especially true for individuals in my study sample, who live in rural areas outside the town that
hosts the bank branch.
Within each period, the following sequence of events occurs:
1. The endowment, and returns on any previous-period savings are revealed.
2. Nature selects which of the two spouses will have the first opportunity to travel to the bank.
This sequential ordering of trips is meant to capture the fact that the bank is located in town,
and opportunities to go to town may arrive at different times for different spouses.
3. The first mover chooses whether to pay banking cost b to go to the bank. The first mover can
only deposit/withdraw from his or her individual account and the joint account.
4. The second spouse observes the choices of the first mover and decides whether to pay b to go
to the bank. The second mover can only deposit/withdraw from his or her individual account
and the joint account.
5. Any unsaved resources are consumed and the period ends.
I assume that both spouses have perfect information about endowments, interest rates, banking
costs, and one another’s savings choices.
Given this setup, the objective is now to study how heterogeneity in discount factors impacts the
efficiency of household savings behavior. The answer to this question will depend on how spouses
make decisions. For example, if spouses bargained cooperatively with one another and were able
to commit to future actions, households would never save in a bank account with a dominated
interest rate. In order to explore strategic behavior, I therefore assume that agents cannot commit
to future actions, and cannot commit to sanction a spouse for past behavior. Given this, I study
subgame perfect Nash equilibria to the savings game outlined above.
2.2 Equilibrium Savings Strategies
In what follows, I restrict my attention to pure strategy equilibria. I further assume that if more than
one pure strategy equilibrium exists, the couple will never choose a Pareto dominated equilibrium.
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Note that when δA 6= δB this refines the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria to those that generate
a unique consumption allocation {c∗1,c∗2}.8
I solve the game by working backwards. For expositional clarity, I will refer to the first mover
as agent A or the husband and the second mover as agent B or the wife. The solution to the second
(and final) period problem is straightforward – since there is no opportunity to consume in the
future, individuals will withdraw their bank savings and consume all available resources. In the
first period, the second mover will make savings choices that account for this fact, taking as given
the earlier choices of the first mover. Since the second mover has the “last word” on savings
allocations, she will always invest as efficiently as possible. Moreover, if the second mover saves
in account a, she will always allocate savings so that u′ (c1) = RaδBu′ (c2).
The first mover takes account of this behavior when forming his savings strategy. It is easy to
see how preference heterogeneity can cause inefficiencies by considering an example where the
second mover’s individual account bears the highest rate of return (RB = Rmax ≡max{RA,RB,RJ})
and strictly dominates the joint account (RJ < Rmax) and the first mover’s individual account (RA <
Rmax).
Suppose parameters are such that if the first mover does nothing, the second mover will save
in her individual account so that u′ (c1) = δBRmaxu′ (c2). If the couple is perfectly matched on
discount factors (δA = δB), the first mover will be happy to let the second mover save, as the same
allocation maximizes both agents’ utilities. In contrast, consider the case where the first mover
is more patient than his wife (δA > δB) – that is, the first mover wishes to save more at Rmax
than his spouse will allow. Instead of letting his wife save, the first mover could consider saving
more at a dominated interest rate (RA or RJ) – as long as this strategy increases second period
consumption, a sufficiently patient first mover will find it attractive. Note that while the first mover
can deposit as much as he pleases in his individual account (since his spouse cannot withdraw
funds), if he deposits “too much” in the joint account his wife will pay b to go back to the bank,
withdraw the joint savings, and reoptimize. Thus, while preference heterogeneity can lead to use
of both dominated joint and individual accounts, the security of individual accounts make them
more attractive from a strategic perspective, all else equal.
An interesting insight of the model is that the less patient spouse may also engage in inefficient
savings behavior. Suppose instead that δA < δB. The first mover knows that if he does nothing,
his wife will save in her individual account when it is her turn to go to the bank. Since the first
8Multiple pure strategy equilibria will exist when the first mover is indifferent between different strategies (this can
occur due to the transaction costs of saving). However, if the first mover is indifferent between one strategy generating
{c∗1,c∗2} and another strategy generating a different consumption allocation {c∗∗1 ,c∗∗2 }, the second mover must have
a strict preference between the two consumption allocations, since the second mover has a different discount factor.
Thus, the refinement implies that when otherwise indifferent, the first mover will select the strategy that generates the
highest utility for his or her spouse.
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mover does not value the second period very much, he would like to find a way to reduce first
period savings. To accomplish this, he could consider saving just enough (in either the joint or
his individual account) to make the second mover indifferent between going back to the bank and
staying at home. The idea behind this strategy is that even though the second mover would like
to save more, she also wishes to avoid incurring additional banking costs. Thus, transaction costs
make it possible for the impatient spouse to preempt additional savings on the part of the more
patient spouse. Appendix A describes potentially optimal savings strategies in more detail.
The preceding discussion has illustrated that the equilibrium to the savings game need not be
efficient – whenever the couple makes use of a bank account with Ra < Rmax, simply reallocating
savings to the highest return account would lead to a Pareto improvement. Moreover, the theory
makes an even stronger prediction: it is possible to obtain a comparative static where the extent
of the interest rate inefficiency monotonically increases in preference heterogeneity. To see this,
define the “interest loss”, L, to be the difference between the highest possible interest rate and the





if the couple saves
0 if the couple does not save
Given the structure of the game, the second mover will always save as efficiently as possible
(conditional on the choices of the first mover). Thus, the first mover effectively has control over
the magnitude of the interest loss. The next proposition shows that the first mover will implement
increasingly inefficient savings strategies as his or her discount factor diverges from that of the
second mover:
Proposition 1 Consider a couple with access to interest rates {RA,RB,RJ} who are playing a
pure strategy, non Pareto dominated, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the savings game. Fix
endowments {y1,y2} and transaction costs {b,w}, as well as the discount factor of the second
mover. When a couple is perfectly matched on discount factors (δA = δB), L = 0. L must increase
as δA monotonically diverges from δB.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result is intuitive – as discount factors diverge, spouses are willing to pay more to exert
control over the time path of consumption. Since the discount factor of the second mover is fixed,
the first mover can always choose from the same set of savings strategies. Therefore as preference
heterogeneity increases the first mover is willing to use increasingly costly savings strategies to
exert control, which means L must get increasingly larger.
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2.3 Caveats
The model developed above is highly stylized and focuses on a single motivation for inefficient
savings behavior. One key assumption is that how resources are saved (e.g. individually versus
jointly) has no impact on the within-period consumption allocation (this is by default, since all
consumption in the model is public). In practice, households allocate resources over a range of
different public and private consumption goods. In this context, another reason spouses may save
inefficiently is if the type of account used for saving impacts the within-period consumption allo-
cation, even conditional on the aggregate level of consumption. This would be the case if saving
individually increased individual bargaining power, or if saving individually helped spouses hide
resources from their partner. These forces would give spouses in couples with perfectly matched
time preferences (but imperfectly aligned preferences within-period) incentives to save in lower-
return individual accounts. These forces seem plausible ex-ante (indeed, I explicitly designed the
experiment to test for informational considerations). I therefore discuss empirical support for these
alternative hypotheses in Sections 5 and 6.
Moreover, while it makes a strong prediction, one drawback of Proposition 1 is that it holds
conditional on incomes, banking costs, and the discount factor of the second mover. Couples are
formed by matches made on the marriage market, so it is not feasible to isolate plausibly exogenous
variation in preference heterogeneity. Therefore a key concern is that preference heterogeneity
may be correlated with other determinants of household savings behavior, such as incomes or
overall patience. I address this in two ways: in what follows I derive one testable prediction
that holds unconditional on the above-mentioned factors, as well as two predictions that hold
conditionally. When evaluating the predictions empirically, I also progressively control for a wide
range of observable characteristics of couples to test the robustness of the results.
2.4 Testable Predictions
To map the model to the experimental context, consider a sample of couples who are character-
ized by some distribution of income, banking costs, and spousal discount factors {δA,δB}. These
couples are randomly assigned different sets of interest rates {RA,RB,RJ}.
I begin with a simple prediction that holds unconditional on income, banking costs, and other
economic parameters:
T1. Perfectly matched couples (δA = δB) will always save efficiently (in the sense that L = 0),
whereas poorly matched couples (δA 6= δB) will not.
The next testable prediction characterizes patterns of individual and joint account use with respect
to preference heterogeneity. It is important to keep in mind that both individual and joint accounts
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may be used strategically. Thus, overall patterns of individual versus joint account use are ambigu-
ous. However, consider the subset of couples for whom the joint account offers the highest rate of
return. Since the interest rate loss L is increasing in discount factor heterogeneity by Proposition
1, it must be that for this subset of couples individual account use increases with discount factor
heterogeneity.
T2. Consider the subset of couples for whom the joint account offers the highest rate of return.
Conditional on banking costs, the discount factor of the second mover, and income, rates of
individual account use will increase with preference heterogeneity.
This testable prediction would also be consistent with a model where couples save according to
different rules of thumb. However, this alternative can be ruled out by the final testable prediction:
T3. Conditional on banking costs, the discount factor of the second mover, and income, the
interest rate loss, L, will increase in preference heterogeneity.
An attractive property of the testable predictions is that there is no mechanical reason for all three to
hold simultaneously. This is especially useful since the bulk of my analysis relies on heterogeneous
treatment effects – the likelihood that an alternative mechanism generates all three patterns in the
data is lower than the likelihood that an alternative mechanism generates patterns consistent with
a subset of the predictions. I now describe the field experiment and the data used to test these
predictions.
3 Experimental Design and Data
3.1 Experimental Design
Context The experiment took place in Western Province, Kenya, in areas surrounding the town
of Busia. Busia is a commercial trading center straddling the Kenya-Uganda border. The town is
well served by the formal banking sector, hosting over six banks at the time of field activities. The
financial partner for this study is Family Bank of Kenya. At the time of the experiment the bank
had over 600,000 customers, 50 branches throughout the country, Ksh 13 billion (approximately
$163 million at an exchange rate of Ksh 80 per $1) in assets, and actively targeted low and middle
income individuals as clients.
All study participants were offered Family Bank’s Mwananchi accounts. This account could
be opened with any amount of money, though a minimum operating balance of Ksh 100 ($1.25)
could not be withdrawn. The account paid no interest, but deposits were free of charge and there
were no recurring maintenance fees. The only fees associated with the account were withdrawal
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fees, which were Ksh 62 ($0.78) over the counter and Ksh 30 ($0.38) with an ATM card. Account
holders could purchase an ATM card for Ksh 300 ($3.75), though this was not mandatory.
At the outset of the study, I identified communities surrounding 19 local primary schools, which
would serve as group meeting grounds (all experimental activities were conducted in these group
sessions). These communities were situated either on the outskirts of Busia town or in nearby rural
areas. Trained field officers issued meeting invitations to married couples in these areas where (1)
neither spouse had an account with Family Bank but at least one spouse was potentially interested
in opening one and (2) both spouses had national ID cards and were able to attend the meeting.9
Just 7 percent of otherwise eligible couples were excluded due to pre-existing ownership of Family
Bank accounts and approximately 29 percent of issued invitations were redeemed over the course
of the study. Thus while far from universal, takeup rates are high enough that the sample represents
a nontrivial fraction of targeted married couples in the catchment area.
Interventions All participating couples were given the opportunity to open up to three Family
Bank accounts: an individual account in the name of the husband, an individual account in the
name of the wife, and a joint account. To maximize takeup, I funded each opened account with
the Ksh 100 minimum operating balance (this amount could not be withdrawn by participants – it
simply made opening an account costless). While participants could in principle open an account
with Family Bank at any time, only those accounts opened during experimental meetings were
eligible for the operating balance subsidy and the experimental interventions, which are described
below.10
Intervention 1 - Interest Rates Each potential account was randomly assigned an interest
rate (respondents drew envelopes with the interest rates from tins upon arrival at the meeting).
Since prediction T2 only holds when the joint account offers the highest rate of return, I designed
the experiment so that individual accounts could bear either 0, 2, 6, or 10 percent 6-month yields
(with equal probability), while joint accounts could bear either 2, 6, or 10 percent 6-month yields
(with equal probability). These interest rates were very high compared to market alternatives:
small scale savings balances could earn at most 0.5-2.0 percentage points of interest annually
given bank accounts available in Busia at the time of the experiment. The experimental interest
rates were temporary, and expired after six months.11 Since many respondents had low levels of
9Family Bank (and all other banks in Kenya) require that account holders have national ID cards. The majority
of individuals in Kenya have a national ID card as it is legally required of all adult citizens and necessary in order to
vote, buy or sell land, and seek formal employment.
10A subset of opened accounts were also randomly selected to receive free ATM cards. A description and analysis
of this treatment is presented in Schaner (2013). I do not discuss this intervention further, as accounting for it has no
impact on any of the results presented in this paper.
11In order to make interest rates as salient as possible, couples were given reminder cards for each account that
they opened. All cards, including those given to individuals opening accounts that did not bear any interest, featured a
10
education, enumerators explained what an interest rate was and provided numerical examples for
each interest rate that was drawn. The empirical results show that respondents understood and
robustly responded to the interest rates (see Appendix Table D3).
The three interest rate draws were independent of one another, and therefore created random
variation in the relative rates of return between accounts, even conditional on an account’s interest
rate. I use what I refer to as the “excess interest rate” to capture this variation:
excessa = Ra−max
{
R j : j 6= a
}
Conditional on Ra the experiment created 10 percentage points of random variation in excessa for
each account type.12 After observing their interest rates, couples were separated and each spouse
was administered a baseline survey. One concern is that randomizing the interest rates before
conducting the baseline influenced survey responses. However, interest rates are not systematically
associated with elicited discount factors, baseline self reports of savings levels, savings device use,
or self reported decision making power regarding consumption and saving. It is therefore likely
that the randomization had little impact on survey responses. After the baseline, couples were
reunited and decided which accounts to open.13
Intervention 2 - Extra Statements In order to test whether the ability to hide savings was
an important driver of individual account use, 50 percent of participating couples were randomly
selected for an "extra statements" offer.14 If a selected couple decided to open an individual account
for (without loss of generality) spouse A, the enumerator processing the couple’s paperwork asked
if the spouses would consent to allow spouse B to receive extra statement cards. The cards, if
presented by spouse B at the bank, entitled him or her to learn the current balance of spouse A’s
account. These cards were only valid for 6 months, and were not given to couples unless both
spouses gave their consent.
reminder to save. The interest payments were made by IPA-Kenya and after the six month period, balances earned no
interest (respondents were informed of this ex-ante), which is standard for the Mwananchi account and other current
accounts in Kenya.
12Appendix Figure D1 illustrates the interest rate design, including the variation in the excess interest rates.
13The fact that couples decided which accounts to open together could have impacted account opening choices. In
particular, this could have increased the degree of cooperation between spouses – this would reduce the likelihood of
observing inefficient savings behavior in the sample. The public decision making could have also nudged couples to
open joint accounts over individual accounts, in which case my results will understate the preference for individual
accounts in the sample.
14Due to delays in approvals from the bank, extra statements were not offered to the 98 couples (16 percent of the
sample) in the first 6 (of 33) experimental sessions.
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3.2 Data
I use two data sources in the analysis – data from one-on-one baseline surveys (spouses were sepa-
rated for the interviews), and administrative data on account use from the bank. The administrative
data provided by the bank includes the first six months’ transaction history for all accounts opened
under the auspices of the project. The baseline survey collected basic demographic information, as
well as information on rates of time preference, decision making power in the household, income,
current use of a variety of savings devices, and cross reports of spousal income and savings.
Measuring Rates of Time Preference The baseline elicited time preferences using choices be-
tween different amounts of money at different times, as opposed to different amounts of goods at
different times. I made this choice for three reasons. First, Ashraf et al. (2006) find that while
time preference parameters estimated using choices between money, rice, and ice cream were all
correlated, only the parameters estimated using money choices significantly predicted takeup and
use of a commitment savings product. Second, even though discount rates estimated using money
choices should theoretically reflect external interest rates, in practice respondents do not appear
to take account of this when making choices (see Andreoni and Sprenger 2010 for a summary).
Finally, cash lotteries made intuitive sense to respondents given that the group sessions revolved
around bank accounts and savings.
All questions were framed as a choice between a smaller amount of money at a nearer time t
(xt) and a larger amount of money at a farther time t+τ (xt+τ).15 In total, participants responded to
10 tables of monetary choices, with each table consisting of 5 separate choices between a smaller
Ksh xt ∈ {290,220,150,80,10} and larger xt+τ = Ksh 300.16 In order to make decisions salient,
respondents were given a 1 in 5 chance of winning one of their choices (the choice was also selected
at random). The questions involved sizable amounts of cash relative to respondents’ incomes – for
comparison, median reported weekly earnings in the sample were Ksh 700 for men and Ksh 300 for
women. If a respondent won one of her choices, she had the option of having the funds deposited
directly in her bank account, or picking the cash up at the field office, also located in Busia town.17
15This method is common to most empirical studies that attempt to measure rates of time preference in developing
countries. Examples include Ashraf et al. (2006), Bauer and Chytilova (2009), Shapiro (2010), Tanaka et al. (2010),
and Dupas and Robinson (2013).
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instead of "today" (0) to avoid confounding the
discount factor estimates with differences in transaction costs of obtaining the funds in the near versus far term, or
degrees of trust as to whether the money would be delivered (Harrison et al. 2004). I also assume that all respondents
would prefer Ksh 300 in the future to Ksh 0 sooner, and that all respondents would prefer Ksh 300 sooner to Ksh 300
in the future. Adding these imputed responses leaves 70 choices for each individual.
17The majority of cash winners (79 percent) chose to have their payments deposited in a bank account. The bank
account may have been attractive because the respondents did not have to remember to pick up the funds at any specific
time, because the bank was more conveniently located, or because the individuals intended to use their new accounts
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As in Tanaka et al. (2010), I use nonlinear least squares to estimate the discount factors. For
each individual I assume that utility is linear in money amounts over the range Ksh 0-300. Then
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I topcoded δ̂i at δ , the value of δ̂i obtained via nonlinear least squares for always-patient responses
and bottomcoded δ̂i at δ , the value of δ̂i for always-impatient responses.18
Panels A and B of Figure 1 graph the distribution of estimated discount factors for men and
women. Discount factors span a wide range of values, but on average study participants appear
to be very impatient, with weekly discount factors averaging 0.72 for men and 0.70 for women.
These discount factor estimates are lower than estimates in studies of individuals in developing
countries in Asia, but consistent with other studies in Africa that have found very high rates of
impatience regarding the timing of cash payments.19
The histograms also illustrate the extent of censoring in the sample. First, 14 percent of indi-
viduals were “always impatient”, and preferred Ksh 10 sooner to Ksh 300 in the future in all tables.
Nonlinear least squares converges to a discount factor estimate very close to zero for this group.
Another 24 percent of individuals were “always patient” and preferred Ksh 300 in the future to
all sooner amounts. In general, this measurement error will lead me to overestimate match quality
in couples with censored discount factors, which should bias the empirical results away from the
testable predictions.
My baseline measure of intrahousehold preference heterogeneity is simply the difference be-
tween the male and female estimated discount factors: hetc ≡ δ̂Mc− δ̂Fc. While 13 percent of cou-
ples had identical discount factor estimates, many couples had estimates that differ substantially.
In the analysis I frequently compare the behavior of well and poorly matched couples. To do this I
label the 50 percent of the sample with the most closely aligned discount factors as “well matched”
and refer to the remaining couples as “poorly matched”. This corresponds to
∣∣∣δ̂Mc− δ̂Fc∣∣∣≤ 0.193
and is equivalent to the couple’s discount factors being within 0.528 standard deviations of one
another.
for saving anyway.
18This led to the censoring of 17 estimated discount factors from below and 37 estimated discount factors from
above.
19For Asia see Ashraf et al. (2006) Bauer and Chytilova (2009), Shapiro (2010), and Tanaka et al. (2010)). For
Africa see Dupas and Robinson (2013) and Giné et al. (2011).
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Panel C of Figure 1 shows a weighted scatter plot of δ̂M and δ̂F , with well matched couples
indicated by darker shading. The figure shows that there is only weak assortative matching in my
sample: the correlation coefficient between spousal discount factors is 0.08. The figure also shows
that individuals in well matched couples are more patient on average (also see Appendix Table D1).
Since a couple’s overall patience level could be an important determinant of savings behavior, in
what follows I explicitly show that controlling for the level discount factors of the husband and
wife does not substantively impact my empirical results.
It is likely that my discount factor estimates reflect multiple determinants of savings motives,
including discount factors, risk aversion, state dependence, and so on. Given this, I prefer to inter-
pret the results in terms of heterogeneity in savings motives more broadly, rather than heterogeneity
in discount factors specifically. A bigger concern would be if the measure of heterogeneity is cor-
related with other characteristics of couples that determine savings behavior for reasons unrelated
to differences in savings motives (e.g. a general ability of spouses to work well together). To
address this issue I present specifications that control for spousal levels of and heterogeneity in
observable characteristics. Also note that regardless of interpretation, my measure of preference
heterogeneity is still useful for testing a null hypothesis of efficient households: if all households
make efficient investment choices, I should not observe differences in efficiency by match quality.
Sample Characteristics and Randomization Verification The sample consists of 598 non-
polygamous married couples.20 Table 1 presents baseline characteristics of the sample and checks
that these characteristics are uncorrelated with treatments. Respondents are of relatively low so-
cioeconomic status, but almost all respondents reported using at least one savings device at base-
line, with saving at home and saving with ROSCAs (rotating savings and credit associations – a
type of informal savings group found in much of the developing world) most common. Formal
bank and mobile money accounts were less prevalent, particularly among women − while 30 per-
cent of men reported owning a bank account at baseline, just 12 percent of women reported owning
a bank account. Over half of men and women also reported other informal savings (this was mostly
investment in livestock).
I check randomization by running individual level regressions of each characteristic listed in
Table 1 on five treatments of interest: the excess interest rate on the husband’s, wife’s, and joint
account, as well as the extra statements treatment and a dummy for whether the individual was
selected for a cash payment.21 Columns 3-7 of Table 1 report regression coefficients and standard
20I dropped 179 polygamous couples from the sample since strategic behavior may be very different in households
with more than one female head. However, the results are robust (though in some cases somewhat attenuated) to
including them.
21I present randomization verification results for excess interest rates rather than the interest rates themselves be-
cause I focus on excess interest rates in the analysis. Randomization verification results for the interest rates themselves
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errors for each treatment (rows correspond to a single regression). I also estimate all equations
jointly via seemingly unrelated regression to test whether each treatment is significant across all
equations. The p-values from these joint tests appear in braces in the last row of Table 1.
Overall, the randomization appears to have functioned well. The number of coefficients signifi-
cant at the 90 percent level or higher is approximately equal to the expected number due to chance,
and there are no systematic patterns across the different treatments. Importantly, excess interest
rates are uncorrelated with discount factor heterogeneity.
The joint test does suggest that balance is off for cash payments, however. Additional random-
ization verification (see Appendix Table D2) shows that significantly fewer cash payments were
awarded than expected (17.5 percent instead of the expected 20 percent). It is important to note that
all randomization was conducted in the field, by allowing respondents to draw folded envelopes
from tins. Since fewer cash payments were awarded than expected, this suggests that the lack of
balance is due to chance rather than enumerator deviations from the experimental protocol. (Enu-
merators conducting randomization were supervised throughout the study and carefully trained
not to allow a participant a second draw from the tin if the participant was unhappy with his or
her result.) Fortunately, cash prize receipt is uncorrelated with preference heterogeneity and the
excess interest rates. Thus there is no mechanical reason why these payments should impact the
main testable implications. However, in the interest of caution I control for husband and wife cash
payment selection throughout the analysis. As expected, the results are extremely similar if I omit
these controls. Furthermore, results are similar if I simply drop couples selected for at least one
cash payment or exclude the cash payment deposit from measures of account use.
Basic Overview of Account Use Before beginning the main analysis, Table 2 summarizes well
and poorly matched couples’ use of the experimental bank accounts. The first panel describes
account opening choices. While all couples opened at least one account, very few couples opened
all three. Instead the most popular choices were either only opening a joint account (56 percent of
couples) or opening two individual accounts (29 percent of couples). Even though there was no
monetary cost to open all three accounts, the additional time spent doing paperwork may have been
enough to dissuade couples from opening accounts that they were very certain they would never
use – since enumerators explained that the Ksh 100 opening balance could not be withdrawn from
the accounts, there was no strategic reason to open all three accounts in order to earn additional
cash.
I exclude the Ksh 100 minimum balance from all measures of account use – thus, unopened and
opened but unused accounts are treated equivalently. As motivated by the theoretical framework,
are very similar. The extra statements treatment dummy is coded to zero for the individuals in the first six sessions who
were not eligible for the treatment. I therefore include an additional dummy variable that identifies these individuals
in all regressions.
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a key outcome is whether an account was used for saving – I define a couple to have saved in
account a if at least one deposit (other than the initial minimum balance subsidy) was made in the
first 6 months following account opening. The next two panels show that 43 percent of couples
saved in at least one account. This figure drops to 27 percent when deposits for the discount factor
elicitation payoffs are excluded.22 The 43 percent of couples who do save make an average of 3
deposits in the six months following account opening and hold an average daily balance of just
under Ksh 1,000 ($12.50) in their experimental accounts.
Based on Table 2, the savings behavior of well and poorly matched couples appears to be quite
similar. However, these summary statistics are not very useful for evaluating the theory in Section
2. First, recall that individuals in poorly matched couples may make strategic use of both joint
and individual accounts – so simply comparing overall rates of joint and individual account use
by match quality is not instructive. Moreover, since both more and less patient spouses may save
strategically, there are no testable predictions regarding average balances or number of deposits in
accounts. Rather, it is necessary to evaluate the theory by focusing on how efficiently resources
are saved. The next section therefore turns to the testable predictions to assess support for the the
ideas in Section 2.
4 Main Results
4.1 Unconditional Testable Predictions
I begin the empirical analysis with the simplest testable prediction, which holds unconditional on
spousal discount factors and other determinants of savings propensity. This first prediction is that
perfectly matched couples always save efficiently, while poorly matched couples do not. Before
moving to the analysis, it is necessary to address one complication in assessing the efficiency of
couples’ savings choices. To simplify the theory, I assumed that banking costs were nonstochastic
and the same for all accounts. In practice, the marginal cost of going to the bank is low when
an individual is in town for another reason, but high when an individual must make a trip to
town specifically to go to the bank. In such a context, a joint bank account offers an important
advantage: the couple can always send the spouse with the lowest cost of going to town to the
bank. Consequently it may be efficient for a couple to choose a joint account even when the joint
interest rate is dominated by that of an individual account.
A simple way to address this issue is to study the subsample of couples where the joint account
offers the highest rate of return (RJ = Rmax) – in this case use of an account with a dominated
22For the main analysis I include the cash payments in measures of account use, since efficient households should
always invest these payments in the highest return account. The results are, however, robust to using measures of
account use that ignore these payments.
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interest rate is clear evidence of inefficient savings behavior. In practice, I see that just 3.9 percent
(7 of 180) of well matched couples in this subsample incur a positive interest rate loss, whereas 12.6
percent (23 of 183) of poorly matched couples incur a positive interest rate loss. The difference in
these proportions is significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
This result is also consistent with the hypothesis that well and poorly matched couples use
different rules of thumb for saving (i.e. “save jointly” vs. “save individually”). Fortunately, one can
use the fact that efficiency requires couples to respond to relative rates of return between accounts
(as measured by excessa) to derive a more novel way to assess savings efficiency. Specifically,
imagine a population of couples with heterogeneous banking costs. Fix individual interest rate Ri.
Panel A of Figure 2 graphs the share of this population that would efficiently save in individual
account i at different levels of excessi (note that increases in excessi correspond to decreases in
R−i and RJ). Since the individual account has higher transaction costs it will never be efficient to
save in account i if excessi < 0. If there is a mass of households who have equivalent individual
interest rates that dominate the joint interest rate, there could be a discrete jump up in the savings
rate at an excess rate of zero. Since the field experiment generated lumpy variation in the set of
interest rates presented to couples, the existence of such a mass seems reasonable. As the excess
interest rate increases beyond zero, the share of households saving in account i will increase, as the
individual account comes to dominate more and more joint accounts. At some point, the excess
rate on the individual account will become so high (i.e. RJ will become so low) that account i
dominates the joint account for all couples who are willing to save at Ri. On the graph, this occurs
at excessi = Ei (Ri).
Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates efficient savings responses for the joint account. The shape is
similar to that for individual accounts – however, since the joint account has lower banking costs
than individual accounts, it is efficient for couples to begin to save jointly at negative excess interest
rates. On the graph, the lowest excess rate at which any couple is willing to save jointly is excessJ =
−EJ (RJ), and all households will choose the joint account once excessJ reaches zero. Notice that
there is a positive slope only for positive excess rates when considering individual accounts and a
positive slope only for negative excess rates when considering joint accounts. This asymmetry is a
striking implication of efficient investment in the presence of heterogeneous banking costs.
I generate the empirical analog of Figure 2 by running the following regression separately by
account type (individual versus joint) and match quality:
savedac = β0 + ex′acδ + z
′
acλ + εac (1)
Where savedac indicates that couple c saved in account a, exac is a vector of dummy variables for
the excess interest rate on account a, and zac is a vector of dummy variables for account a’s interest
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rate.23 I then calculate predicted values of savedac for each value of the excess rate, assuming equal
distribution of the sample at each interest rate (0, 2, 6, and 10 percent for individual accounts; 2, 6,
and 10 percent for joint accounts). Figure 3 presents the result of this exercise. The dashed lines
are regression lines fit to the point estimates, where each point is weighted by the inverse of its
standard error. Recall from Figure 2 that individual account use by well matched couples could
jump discretely up at excessac = 0. Since −2 is the largest negative value of the excess interest
rate in the sample, I therefore fit separate lines for excessac ≤ −2 (this slope should be zero) and
excessac ≥ −2 (this slope should be positive). In contrast, the slope for joint accounts should be
positive below an excess rate of zero and flat thereafter, so the lines are drawn above and below
excessac = 0.
Column A graphs account use for well matched couples. The results for individual and joint
accounts are both consistent with efficient savings behavior. Specifically, the share of couples
using individual accounts is essentially flat and not statistically different from zero until the excess
interest rate reaches zero, where the share saving jumps up. Beyond this point the share increases,
though there is no subsequent plateau. For joint accounts, the share of well matched couples saving
increases when the excess interest rate is negative and then plateaus after an excess rate of zero.
However, there is no initial plateau at a low savings rate when the excess interest rate is negative.
These "missing" plateaus suggest that the experimental variation in the excess interest rate
was not large enough to reach the thresholds Ei (Ri) and −EJ (RJ) illustrated in Figure 2; in other
words, the excess interest rate was never large enough to dominate banking cost concerns for the
majority of couples in the sample. This is conceivable given the temporary nature of the interest
rates and the low savings levels of most couples – the 75th percentile total average daily balance
among savers was Ksh 782. Even foregoing 10 percentage points of interest would only cost the
75th percentile household Ksh 78. In comparison, the cost of round trip travel to and from the bank
meets or exceeds Ksh 100 for over half the sample. I therefore conjecture that relative rates of
return only trumped banking cost concerns for couples with small banking cost differentials.
Column B of Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of poorly matched couples. Here rates of saving
are completely insensitive to the excess interest rate. It is possible that the variation in the excess
interest rate was simply not large enough to incite a substantial change in behavior for these cou-
ples. Since interest rates were temporary and average balances small, private savings deviations
were "cheap" in terms of interest rate losses.
23As a result of the experimental design, some values of the excess interest rate were only realized for a very
small number of accounts: 14 accounts had an excess interest rate of 2, 12 accounts had an excess interest rate of 6,
and 13 accounts had an excess interest rate of 10. For each of these values, I downcode the excess interest rate by
two percentage points (results are invariant to simply dropping these accounts). Similarly, I pool excessac =−10 and
excessac =−8 as the omitted category in the regressions. I do this in order to identify all interest rate dummy variables,
as accounts with zero percent interest had excess interest rates unique to them.
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To test the significance of the patterns in Figure 3, I generate splines in the excess interest rate.
To match the theoretical shifts in slope in Figure 2, I place a knot at excessac = −2 for individual
accounts and a knot at excessac = 0 for joint accounts. I then run the following account level
regression separately for well matched and poorly matched couples:
savedac = β0 +β1 (below× indiv)ac +β2 (above× indiv)ac + (2)





where belowac is the spline capturing the slope below the knot, aboveac is the spline capturing the
slope above the knot, indivac is an individual account indicator, jointac is a joint account indicator,
zac is a vector including interest rate dummies, the joint account dummy, and joint×interest rate
interactions, and xc is a vector of additional controls.
Panels A and B of Table 3 present results of this specification first for well matched couples,
then for poorly matched couples. The first column only includes additional controls for husband
and wife cash prize selection – this column essentially mirrors the results in Figure 3 and confirms
that the positive responses exhibited by well matched couples are significantly different from zero.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the slopes is large. These results imply that increasing the individual
excess interest rate from 0 to 10 would result in a 16 percentage point increase in the savings rate,
while increasing the joint excess interest rate from −10 to 0 would result in a 21 percentage point
increase in the savings rate. These impacts are very large when compared to dependent variable
means (10 percent for individual accounts and 31 percent for joint accounts). In contrast, I cannot
reject the null that poorly matched couples did not respond to the excess interest rate.
I also test the robustness of the results in Table 3 to the inclusion of a variety of controls for
observable characteristics of couples. First, the second column adds controls related to rates of
time preference. To account for general differences in patience levels between well and poorly
matched couples I control for δ̂Mc and δ̂Fc linearly (the addition of these controls is also motivated
by the conditional predictions, which hold given the discount factor of the second mover spouse). I
also include two dummy variables to identify censoring of the discount factor for each spouse – one
indicating upper censoring and one indicating lower censoring. The second column adds additional
controls for demographic characteristics and the final column adds further controls for economic
characteristics.24 For non-binary characteristics I include the linear and squared terms for both
husband and wife, as well as the interaction between the linear values for husband and wife. For
24Demographic controls include age, years of education, a literacy dummy, number of children, and experimental
session fixed effects, which capture distance from the bank and area of residence. The economic controls include
individual income, a dummy for mobile phone ownership, and a dummy indicating that an individual is either a
subsistence farmer or has no job. When the value of a control variable is missing, I recode it to zero and generate
a separate dummy variable to identify these observations. I therefore also include interactions between husband and
wife missing dummies in all specifications. This convention is held throughout the analysis.
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binary variables, I include the dummy variable for both husband and wife as well as the interaction.
This allows me to control for both levels of and heterogeneity in observable characteristics. The
results in Panels A and B are very robust to adding these controls.
Panel C of Table 3 formally tests whether the excess interest rate responses of well and poorly
matched couples differ. This panel also progressively allows for heterogeneous treatment effects
with respect to the time preference, demographic, and economic control sets. To do this, I include
main effects for each covariate and interactions of the covariate with the excess interest rate splines.
There are 68 main effects in the economic control set. If I were to separately interact each main
effect with the four excess interest rate splines, this would lead to 340 covariates in the economic
control set alone. To reduce the number of covariates, I impose the restrictions β1 = β4 (“excess
zero” in Panel C) and β2 = β3 (“excess positive” in Panel C). This seems reasonable, as I cannot
reject these restrictions in Panels A and B (p-values for the relevant F-tests range from 0.51-0.92).
I estimate the restricted version of equation 2 separately by match quality. I demean each in-
cluded covariate using means among well matched couples before generating the excess interest
rate interaction terms and running the regressions. When demeaned this way, the coefficients on
the splines in Panel C of Table 3 reflect the response to the excess interest rate at the average
value of included demographic characteristics observed among well matched couples. Thus if the
heterogeneous responses observed in Panels A and B were driven by some other characteristic in
the control sets, then the results for poorly matched couples would mirror those for well matched
couples once the excess interest rate response is allowed to vary with that control. I use seem-
ingly unrelated regression to test equality of the excess interest rate responses for well and poorly
matched couples.
As expected given random assignment of interest rates, the results for well matched couples do
not substantially change with the addition of controls. In contrast, the excess interest rate responses
for poorly matched couples become more negative after allowing for heterogeneous treatment
effects with respect to controls. This suggests that differences in observables between well and
poorly matched couples are not driving the initial heterogeneous treatment effects. Furthermore, I
consistently reject equality of responses to the excess interest rate between well and poorly matched
couples across all specifications.
I now turn to conditional predictions T2 and T3 to explore how patterns of account use and
actual interest rate losses vary with match quality.
4.2 Conditional Testable Predictions
The second testable prediction states that when RJ = Rmax, couples’ use of individual accounts
should increase as match quality decreases. (That is, there should be a U-shaped relationship
20
between individual account use and δM−δF ). Figure 4 tests this prediction graphically. The figure
presents results of the following local linear regression
yc = g(hetc)+ εc (3)
where yc is the outcome of interest and hetc = δ̂Mc− δ̂Fc. The sample is limited to the subset
of couples for whom the joint account offers the highest rate of return. The solid line in Panel
A graphs savings rates in any individual account (i.e. a couple is coded as saving individually if
either the husband’s or the wife’s individual account was used for saving). As predicted, rates of
individual account use follow a striking U shape – well matched couples (who are demarcated by
gray vertical lines in each panel) are least likely to save individually and rates of individual account
use increase in preference heterogeneity. This is not just because poorly matched couples are more
likely to save – Panel B presents the same graph when the sample is limited to those couples who
saved in at least one account. The U-shaped pattern remains, and shows that well matched savers
choose to save jointly (the efficient choice), whereas poorly matched savers are much more likely
to make use of inefficient individual accounts.
The following regression tests the significance of the graphical results while controlling for
determinants of savings propensity and other potentially confounding factors:
yc = β0 +β1badmatchc + int ′cδ + x
′
cλ + εc (4)
where yc is the outcome of interest and badmatchc indicates poorly matched couples. The re-
gressions also include a vector of dummy variables for each experimental interest rate (intc) and a
vector of additional controls (xc).25
Table 4 presents estimates of β1 ("Poorly Matched") and tests robustness of the results to adding
additional controls. The "basic" control set, in Panel A, only includes the interest rate dummy vari-
ables and dummies for husband and wife cash payment selection. This regression essentially mir-
rors the results of Figure 4. I then progressively add the same set of time preference, demographic,
and economic controls used in Table 3.
As expected given the graphical results, poorly matched couples are significantly more likely
to save in individual accounts, even when limiting the sample to savers. Moreover, the differences
by match quality are substantial – while just 7.8 percent of well matched couples save individually
when RJ = Rmax, over 20 percent of their poorly matched peers choose to save individually. Panel
25Note that although badmatchc is a generated regressor, under the null hypothesis β1 = 0. In this case, traditional
standard errors are consistent (Newey and McFadden 1994). Since the unit of randomization is the couple, I therefore
present either heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (for couple level regressions) or standard errors clustered at the
couple level (for account level regressions).
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B shows that this pattern persists when limiting the sample to couples who saved. Just 18.2 percent
of well matched savers make use of an individual account, whereas over 40 percent of their badly
matched peers save individually. These results are quite robust to adding additional controls – even
though results for savers are only marginally significant after adding the demographic control set,
the point estimates are consistent from specification to specification and large in magnitude.
The results so far strongly suggest that poorly matched couples invest less efficiently than well
matched couples. But how big are these distortions in economic terms? I now exploit the ex-
perimental design to estimate the magnitude of savings misallocation by match quality. This also
permits a test of the final prediction – that the interest rate loss, L, increases with preference hetero-
geneity. To estimate L, I calculate the actual interest rate that each couple earned on experimental
savings balances and subtract it from the maximum interest rate. I code interest rate losses to zero
for all non-savers.
Since lower return joint accounts may be more efficient than higher return individual accounts
when banking cost differentials are large, I also present results where I discount individual interest
rates to reflect higher banking costs. I adjust individual interest rates downward to account for
banking costs in two different ways. First, I attempt to proxy banking costs using observables.
I conjecture that those couples who travel to Busia town frequently for non-bank related reasons
and those couples who have low travel costs to town will have smaller differential banking costs
(i.e. the joint account offers less in transaction cost savings).26 Appendix B provides additional
detail on how I used principal components analysis to construct a "banking costs index", which
runs from zero (lowest hypothesized banking costs) to one (highest hypothesized banking costs).27
To discount individual interest rates I multiply the cost index by an assumed maximum interest
discount and adjust individual interest rates by the resulting product. As a further robustness check,
I present a set of specifications where I discount all individual interest rates uniformly. While this
method cannot capture heterogeneity in banking costs within the population, it does capture the
fact that individual accounts incur higher banking costs without inducing a correlation between the
size of the discount and other determinants of savings propensity correlated with the banking cost
index.
I first study interest rate losses graphically. Figure 5 presents the results of local linear regres-
sions of interest rate losses on preference heterogeneity. Consistent with the theory, losses follow
a U-shape, with the lowest values observed among well matched couples. This pattern holds with
and without adjustments to individual interest rates. (The figure illustrates results using adjust-
26In practice I assume that subsistence farmers and the unemployed have higher banking costs. I also assume that
couples who live closer to the bank and couples with pre-existing formal savings accounts have lower differential
banking costs. Here I categorize both bank accounts and SACCO accounts as formal accounts.
27Appendix B also shows that savers with higher proxied costs are more likely to use joint accounts, and that excess
interest rate responses are concentrated among couples with low proxied costs.
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ments made with proxied banking costs. Results are very similar when individual interest rates are
adjusted uniformly).
Table 5 quantifies interest rate losses by match quality and presents regression results that
include additional controls for observables. The first column does not discount individual interest
rates at all. If poorly matched couples had always chosen the highest return account available, the
average couple would have earned 8.15 percentage points of interest. In practice, these couples
averaged 7.10 percentage points of interest, leading to an interest loss of 1.05 percentage points.
In contrast, well matched couples could have earned a maximum of 8.17 percentage points of
interest and actually earned 7.50 percentage points. Therefore, the "loss gap" between poorly and
well matched couples is 0.39 percentage points of interest, which is significantly different from
zero. Even without accounting for differential banking costs, poorly matched couples appear to
suffer from greater savings misallocation – their losses are 58 percent larger than those of their
well matched peers. Subsequent rows of Table 5 test robustness of this result by first controlling
for cash prize selection and account specific interest rates. I then include the time preference,
demographic, and economic control sets respectively. The loss gap remains significant and its
magnitude grows in size after including additional controls.
The remaining columns repeat this analysis using banking cost adjusted individual interest
rates. Columns 2-4 use the banking cost index and a maximum individual interest discount ranging
from 5 to 15 percentage points (recall that well matched couples’ response to the excess interest
rate in Figure 3 suggests that the maximum discount exceeds 8). The estimated loss gap increases
as discounting increases and is robust to including additional controls. The final three columns
discount all individual interest rates uniformly (I subtract the enumerated discount from the interest
rate for all individual accounts, regardless of proxied banking costs). These results are quite similar
to the results incorporating proxied banking costs.
Overall, the losses in Table 5 are large in percentage terms, but small in absolute terms. For
example, a loss of 3 percentage points in interest amounts to just Ksh 24 ($0.30) for the 75th
percentile saving couple. On the other hand, banking cost differentials persist for the life of the
account, so long run absolute losses due to inefficient individual account use could be much larger.
The core empirical results fit the predictions of the theoretical framework very well. While
well matched couples do a good job of saving efficiently, poorly matched couples do not account
for rates of return between accounts and tend to make use of inefficient individual accounts. These
patterns appear even though badly matched couples understand the interest rates – the results in
Panel C of Appendix Table D3 confirm that the interest rate treatments significantly impacted the
account opening and use choices of badly matched couples.
A central idea behind the private savings theory is that inefficient accounts are used to gain
control of resources rather than obscure information about resources. However, individual ac-
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counts may also enable agents to hide savings from their spouses. Hidden savings could be used to
manipulate the time path of consumption, or to finance hidden consumption, thereby changing the
composition of consumption in a given period. If the benefit of hiding savings is correlated with
preference heterogeneity, this could generate the patterns I observe in the data. The next section
tests this hypothesis.
5 Hidden Information and Account Use
Hidden information appears to be important in households in developing countries.28 Moreover,
there is evidence of hidden savings in my data. For example, when considering spousal cross
reports for saving at home, which is the most common method of saving among couples, 52 percent
of individuals in the sample asserted that they either did not know if their spouse saved at home
or did not know how much money their spouse saved at home. Among those individuals who had
a spouse guess his or her savings amount, 48 percent of the spouses underestimated relative to
the individual’s self report, while 25 percent of the spousal reports were overestimates (the other
27 percent matched their spouse’s report – these were mostly instances where the individual and
spouse reported no savings). Similar patterns appear when considering weekly income and savings
in other devices, such as bank accounts and ROSCAs.
If the return to hiding savings from a spouse is increasing in discount factor heterogeneity,
then hidden savings concerns could be responsible for the main empirical results (though it is not
obvious that such a correlation should exist). I added the "extra statements" treatment to the field
experiment to assess the overall importance of hidden savings in the study population. To gauge if
hidden savings concerns are correlated with preference heterogeneity, I use baseline spousal cross
reports of income and savings device use to construct an “information sharing index” which ranges
from zero (worst informed couples) to one (best informed couples).
Appendix C presents the hidden savings analysis in detail. While the extra statements interven-
tion is somewhat underpowered, I find evidence that hidden savings concerns are important: just
60 percent of individuals who were presented with the extra statement offer consented.29 More-
over, the information index appears to identify couples for whom hiding information is particularly
valuable. Poorly informed couples were less likely to consent to the extra statements intervention
28For example, Anderson and Baland (2002) find that women’s use of ROSCAs in Kenya is consistent with a
model of hidden information. Boozer, Goldstein, and Suri (2009) analyze spousal cross reports of food expenditure in
Ghana and find evidence of hidden consumption. Ashraf (2009) finds evidence that the informational environment has
significant impact on the investment decisions of spouses with low levels of financial control in the Philippines and
de Laat (2008) finds that individuals in split migrant couples in Kenya are willing to expend considerable resources to
acquire information about one another.
29Consent rates were nearly identical by gender – 59.2 percent of men and 60.9 percent of women consented to the
extra statements.
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and also respond more adversely to the extra statements treatment.30
If the earlier results were driven by hidden savings concerns, one would expect to see two
things: first, the information sharing index should be lower among poorly matched couples. Sec-
ond, accounting for information sharing in the previous analyses should dilute the impact of pref-
erence heterogeneity. However, the information index is totally uncorrelated with preference het-
erogeneity (the correlation coefficient between the index and the absolute value of preference het-
erogeneity is 0.017). This foreshadows that accounting for information sharing has no impact on
the main results.
First I check to see if accounting for information flows changes the findings regarding patterns
of account use. Table 6 presents the regression described by equation 4 augmented to include a
dummy variable identifying “poorly informed” couples (those who have a below median informa-
tion sharing index). The initial results pertaining to preference heterogeneity are very robust to
controlling for information flows. At the same time, I find evidence that individual accounts may
be valued for informational purposes: poorly informed households are significantly more likely
to use individual accounts, even conditional on saving. Additional specification testing shown in
Appendix Tables D5 and D6 confirms that information sharing is not driving the results regarding
responses to the excess interest rate and interest rate losses.
Overall, these results are compatible with the theory that hidden information concerns impact
household savings decisions. However, to the extent that these concerns are important, they appear
to be largely orthogonal to preference heterogeneity. This is plausible – hiding savings is likely
valuable because it allows individuals to increase their share of consumption, or tilt consumption
towards goods that they favor. If the benefit of doing so is equally large for individuals in well
and poorly matched households, accounting for it should leave the core results unchanged, which
is what I observe. To complete the discussion of robustness, the next section considers other
alternative explanations for the main results.
6 Alternative Explanations
In setting up the model, the choice to feature only a public consumption good obviated the possi-
bility that private accounts could be strategically used to change what individuals consume (rather,
the only margin of influence was when consumption took place). In practice, individuals may use
private accounts as a tool to change the composition of consumption allocations. One possibil-
ity is that spouses strategically save in individual accounts in order to increase bargaining power.
Alternatively, individual accounts could change the composition of future consumption if there
30I code a couple as "poorly informed" if their information index is below the sample median.
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are mental accounting norms in the household. These concerns would be particularly important if
heterogeneity in time preferences is correlated with heterogeneity in other preferences.
When saving privately impacts bargaining power or the within-period composition of con-
sumption, both spouses will have incentives to save simultaneously in their individual accounts
(this result is established formally in the context of labor supply by Basu 2006 and Browning et al.
2011). In the experiment, just 4 percent of couples saved in both individual accounts. Even among
those couples who opened both individual accounts and saved in at least one account, just 27 per-
cent saved in both individual accounts. This suggests that these concerns are not a major driver of
the use of the individual accounts in this study.
Another way to test whether inefficient account use is driven by a desire to manipulate within-
period consumption allocations is to ask whether the results are robust to including measures of
consumption decision making. I purposely excluded spousal reports of consumption decision mak-
ing from the control sets in the main analysis because these reports could be endogenous to the
degree of strategic savings behavior in the household. As a further robustness check, Appendix
Tables D4-D6 present results that include these decision making controls. As it turns out, the re-
sults are very robust to including these measures of household functioning in addition to the core
time preference, demographic, and economic control sets.
Another possibility is that poorly matched couples choose savings accounts based on rules of
thumb, while well matched couples optimally choose accounts taking account of relative rates of
return. One model that could generate such behavior is one where household bargaining is costly,
and this cost increases as the preferences of household members diverge. If costs are large enough,
households could develop rules of thumb for how to manage savings in order to avoid repeated
bargaining costs. However, poorly matched couples’ lack of response to the excess interest rate is
still somewhat of a puzzle in this case – if savings management were tasked to a single individual,
he or she should still optimally take account of excess interest rates when deciding between his or
her individual account and the joint account.
A final alternative is that poorly matched couples are simply less financially sophisticated than
well matched couples. This theory could rationalize both poorly matched couples’ overuse of
dominated accounts and their lack of sensitivity to the excess interest rate. However, individuals
in well and poorly matched couples have very similar levels of education and literacy (Appendix
Table D1) and both types of couples respond to interest rate levels (Appendix Table D3). More-
over, all the main results are robust to allowing the response to the excess interest rate to vary
with spousal education and literacy (as well as within-couple heterogeneity in education and liter-




This paper sheds light on the underlying drivers of inefficient intertemporal resource allocation
by households. I structured the analysis by first specifying a model in which heterogeneity in
rates of time preference creates incentives for individuals to save strategically, even when doing
so is costly. I then derived three testable implications of the model: (1) perfectly matched couples
will always save efficiently, whereas poorly matched couples will not, (2) as long as RJ = Rmax
individual account use will increase in preference heterogeneity, and (3) interest rate losses on
experimental bank accounts will increase in preference heterogeneity.
The empirical results are consistent with all of these predictions. This is, of course, subject to
the caveat that I cannot completely rule out the hypothesis that the results are driven by some other
omitted characteristic that is correlated with my estimates of preference heterogeneity. However,
the stability of the results to the inclusion of flexible demographic and economic controls, and
to the inclusion of measures of household information flows and decision making, is comforting
and suggests that the results are indeed driven by inefficiencies arising from conflicting savings
motives. I also find evidence that informational concerns impact account use and account choice
in the sample. Couples who are poorly informed about one another’s financial activities respond
most adversely to the “extra statements” treatment and are also more likely to gravitate towards
individual accounts over joint accounts.
An innovative feature of the experimental design is that it allows me to quantify investment
efficiency in terms of interest rates. However, the experimental interest rates were temporary –
it is therefore important to ask whether match quality has broader implications for households’
investment choices. I do observe that well matched couples are significantly more likely to invest in
livestock and the family farm, which are inherently joint methods of saving that likely bear a higher
rate of return than more private savings devices like ROSCAs. While this finding is suggestive,
the baseline data lack detailed information on the costs of and returns to different savings devices,
so it is difficult to precisely assess how this translates into actual interest rate losses for couples.
Incorporating measures of preference heterogeneity into future data collection efforts designed to
measure returns to savings and investment would help shed further light on this issue.
My results add to a growing body of literature that rejects dynamic household efficiency, while
presenting evidence that heterogeneity in discount factors drives inefficient behavior. A novel
feature of this idea is that it provides a mechanism for why some households function well while
others do not: when preferences are well aligned there are no incentives to behave strategically
and therefore no barriers to attaining an efficient outcome. Although this paper studies strategic
savings behavior, the applications are more general. For example, many households in developing
countries either engage in home production (such as farming or animal husbandry) or run small
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businesses. Investment in these activities is an important way of transferring resources across
periods. The insights in this paper suggest that when preferences in the household differ, capital
for these activities will not always be allocated to the most efficient user. This mechanism may
therefore help account for some of the heterogeneity in plot yields (Udry 1996) or microenterprise
returns (de Mel et al. 2009) observed in the developing world. A broader implication of this
mechanism is that greater marriage market frictions could lead to lower quality matches in terms
of preferences, which could give rise to geographical and cultural variation in household efficiency.
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Table 1. Demographic Characteristics and Balance Check
Extra Cash
Husbands Wives Husband Wife Joint Statements Payment N
Age 41.8 35.2 0.172 0.073 0.295 -1.04 1.16 1196
[13.3] [11.8] (0.188) (0.194) (0.201) (1.08) (0.988)
Education 8.07 5.92 -0.035 -0.080 -0.126** 0.073 -0.213 1191
[3.57] [4.03] (0.049) (0.053) (0.056) (0.298) (0.295)
Literate 0.865 0.669 -0.007 -0.007 -0.014*** 0.004 -0.017 1196
[0.342] [0.471] (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.028) (0.033)
Number Children 4.85 4.49 0.047 0.032 0.077* 0.069 0.253 1196
[2.92] [2.54] (0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.225) (0.219)
Subsistence Farmer/No Job 0.407 0.466 0.008 0.010* 0.016*** -0.025 -0.029 1191
[0.492] [0.499] (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.035) (0.038)
Income Last Week 1346 797 -18.7 -28.4 -28.8 -20.0 -357*** 1164
[2747] [1617] (28.5) (25.0) (23.4) (152) (116)
Owns Mobile Phone 0.487 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.072** 0.034 1191
[0.500] [0.495] (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.036) (0.037)
Participates in ROSCA 0.492 0.657 -0.002 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.004 1196
[0.500] [0.475] (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.033) (0.037)
Has Bank Account 0.303 0.119 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.023 0.023 1196
[0.460] [0.324] (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.028) (0.032)
Has a SACCO Account 0.062 0.010 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.010 -0.003 1193
[0.241] [0.100] (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.014)
Saves at Home 0.851 0.898 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.047** 1195
[0.356] [0.303] (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.022)
Has Mobile Money Account 0.309 0.132 -0.007 -0.006 -0.014*** 0.004 -0.020 998
[0.462] [0.339] (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.028) (0.033)
Saves Other Ways 0.582 0.536 0.010 0.007 0.001 0.070** -0.038 998
[0.494] [0.499] (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.032) (0.042)
Total Reported Savings 19874 5266 409 -54.9 -304 963 5690 923
[56668] [13119] (428) (491) (401) (3067) (6970)
Consumption - Husband Decides 0.471 0.377 -0.002 -0.010* -0.004 -0.024 0.002 1189
[0.500] [0.485] (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.032) (0.038)
Consumption - Wife Decides 0.076 0.170 0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.009 0.010 1189
[0.265] [0.376] (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.025)
Consumption - Both Decide 0.403 0.411 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.012 -0.012 1189
[0.491] [0.492] (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.033) (0.037)
Savings - Husband Decides 0.354 0.282 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.029 -0.048 1189
[0.479] [0.450] (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.030) (0.035)
Savings - Wife Decides 0.440 0.491 -0.001 -0.007 -0.005 0.012 0.046 1189
[0.497] [0.500] (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.034) (0.039)
Savings - Both Decide 0.183 0.204 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.014 -0.004 1189
[0.387] [0.403] (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.028) (0.031)
Distance from Bank (Miles) 3.78 3.78 0.035 0.023 0.054 0.006 0.041 1196
[2.21] [2.21] (0.034) (0.035) (0.039) (0.211) (0.152)
Weekly Discount Factor 0.718 0.704 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 0.059*** -0.072*** 1196
[0.368] [0.363] (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.023) (0.031)
Well Matched Couple 0.500 0.500 -0.003 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 0.055 1196
[0.500] [0.500] (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.045) (0.037)
Joint Test (Cross Equation) 0.958 0.510 0.588 0.253 {0.011}**
Excess Interest Rate
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in braces. Columns 3-7 present results 
from regressions of observable characteristics on listed treatments of interest. All standard errors clustered at the 
couple level. Mobile money and other savings data not available for the 98 couples in the first 6 experimental sessions. 
Variables recoded to missing if response was don't know/refused. P-values from the joint test are calculated by jointly 
estimating equations by seemingly unrelated regression. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 
percent confidence levels respectively.    









Couple Chose to Open:
All Three Accounts 0.050 0.057
Joint Account Only 0.562 0.562
Both Individual Accounts 0.274 0.298
One Individual, One Joint Account 0.090 0.054
One Individual Account 0.023 0.030
Couple Saved In:
Any Account 0.421 0.438
Joint Account 0.308 0.274
Individual Account 0.124 0.184
Excluding Cash Payments, Couple Saved In:
Any Account 0.268 0.278
Joint Account 0.174 0.171
Individual Account 0.104 0.127
If Saved, Number Deposits In:
All Accounts 2.53 2.92
[2.82] [3.74]
Joint Account 2.19 2.55
[2.46] [3.84]
Individual Accounts 3.12 3.19
[3.24] [3.04]
If Saved, Average Daily Balance In:
All Accounts 991 998
[2069] [1794]
Joint Account 719 897
[1710] [1695]
Individual Accounts 1587 1040
[2591] [1664]
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets.  
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Panel A. Accounts Owned by Well Matched Couples Only
Excess Low×Indiv 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Excess High×Indiv 0.016** 0.017** 0.014* 0.014*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Excess Low×Joint 0.021* 0.022* 0.023** 0.023*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Excess High×Joint 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
DV Mean 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164
N 897 897 897 897
Panel B. Accounts Owned by Poorly Matched Couples Only
Excess Low×Indiv -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Excess High×Indiv -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Excess Low×Joint -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Excess High×Joint -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
DV Mean 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175
N 897 897 897 897
Panel C. Tests of Equality Across Equations
  Well Matched Couples
Excess Positive 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Excess Zero 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
  Poorly Matched Couples
Excess Positive -0.004 -0.022*** -0.020** -0.020*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Excess Zero -0.004 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
  Tests of Equality of Coefficients Across Equations
Excess Positive {0.024}** {0.000}*** {0.001}*** {0.001}***
Excess Zero {0.290} {0.101} {0.061}* {0.071}*
Joint Test - Both Splines {0.014}** {0.000}*** {0.000}*** {0.000}***
Control Set Basic +Time Pref +Demo. +Economic
Table 3. Responses to the Excess Interest Rate by Match Quality
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses, p-values in braces. 
All regressions include fixed effects that saturate interest rate×joint account and dummies for 
husband and wife cash payment selection. Time preference controls include separate 
dummies for upper/lower censoring of the discount factors of each spouse and the estimated 
discount factor of each spouse. The demographic control set adds controls for experimental 
session fixed effects, spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of children, and 
literacy. The economic control set adds controls for heterogeneity in income, an indicator for 
subsistence farmers or the unemployed, and phone ownership. All controls are demeaned to 
the value among well matched couples. Specifications in Panel C also include interactions 
between the excess interest splines and the included control variables. Cross-equation F-tests 
calculated using seemingly unrelated regression. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
99, 95, and 90 percent confidence levels respectively.
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Table 4. Preference Heterogeneity and Use of Dominated Individual Accounts
Panel A. All Couples With Dominated Individual Accounts
Poorly Matched 0.125*** 0.177*** 0.151*** 0.175***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
N 363 363 363 363
Panel B. Subset of Couples Who Saved in at Least One Account
Poorly Matched 0.244*** 0.376*** 0.224* 0.240*
(0.078) (0.085) (0.117) (0.143)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
N 157 157 157 157
Control Set Basic +Time Pref +Demo. +Economic
Notes: The sample is limited to the subset of couples for whom the joint account bears the 
highest interest rate. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating that a couple saved in any 
individual account. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions 
include dummy variables for each account's interest rate and dummies for husband and wife 
cash payment selection. Time preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower 
censoring of the discount factors of each spouse and the estimated discount factor of each 
spouse. The demographic control set adds controls for experimental session fixed effects, 
spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of children, and literacy. The economic control 
set adds controls for heterogeneity in income, an indicator for subsistence farmers or the 
unemployed, and phone ownership. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 
percent confidence levels respectively.
35
Table 5. Interest Rate Losses by Match Quality
Maximum Individual Discount 5 10 15 5 10 15
Poorly Matched Couples
Maximum Interest Earnings 8.15 6.45 6.01 6.01 6.74 6.16 6.04
Actual Interest Earnings 7.10 5.28 4.17 3.29 5.66 4.72 4.03
Loss 1.05 1.18 1.85 2.72 1.08 1.44 2.01
Well Matched Couples
Maximum Interest Earnings 8.17 6.41 5.93 5.93 6.73 6.11 5.96
Actual Interest Earnings 7.50 5.85 4.92 4.31 6.24 5.46 5.00
Loss 0.664 0.566 1.02 1.63 0.486 0.655 0.965
Loss Gap
A. No Controls 0.389** 0.613*** 0.830*** 1.10*** 0.591*** 0.784*** 1.04***
(0.172) (0.205) (0.316) (0.447) (0.185) (0.253) (0.338)
B. + Basic Controls 0.447*** 0.694*** 0.968*** 1.29*** 0.660*** 0.894*** 1.19***
(0.163) (0.202) (0.308) (0.435) (0.183) (0.248) (0.332)
C. + Time Preference Controls 0.486** 0.917*** 1.41*** 1.92*** 0.798*** 1.21*** 1.66***
(0.219) (0.218) (0.326) (0.464) (0.209) (0.266) (0.355)
D. + Demographic Controls 0.462** 0.855*** 1.36*** 1.90*** 0.744*** 1.14*** 1.61***
(0.218) (0.223) (0.342) (0.490) (0.211) (0.274) (0.369)
E. + Economic Controls 0.462** 0.868*** 1.41*** 2.00*** 0.747*** 1.14*** 1.63***
(0.222) (0.228) (0.348) (0.496) (0.216) (0.282) (0.378)
N 598 598 598 598 598 598 598
No 
Discounting
Proxied Banking Cost Discounting Uniform Discounting
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Basic controls include dummy variables for each account's interest rate and dummies for 
husband and wife cash payment selection. Time preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower censoring of the discount 
factors of each spouse and the estimated discount factor of each spouse. The demographic control set adds controls for experimental session 
fixed effects, spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of children, and literacy. The economic control set adds controls for 
heterogeneity in income, an indicator for subsistence farmers or the unemployed, and phone ownership. Proxied banking costs constructed 
using a principal components index of distance from the bank, spouse specific indicators for subsistence farmers/the unemployed, and spouse 
specific indicators for baseline bank account ownership and SACCO membership. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 
percent confidence levels respectively. 
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Panel A. All Couples With Dominated Individual Accounts
Poorly Matched 0.130*** 0.184*** 0.161*** 0.181***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.042) (0.045)
Poorly Informed 0.113*** 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.096**
(0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
N 363 363 363 363
Panel B. Subset of Couples Who Saved in at Least One Account
Poorly Matched 0.217*** 0.335*** 0.169 0.216
(0.078) (0.087) (0.122) (0.157)
Poorly Informed 0.217*** 0.206*** 0.232** 0.096
(0.085) (0.085) (0.108) (0.131)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
N 157 157 157 157
Control Set Basic +Time Pref +Demo. +Economic
Notes: The sample is limited to the subset of couples for whom the joint account bears the 
highest interest rate. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating that a couple saved in any 
individual account. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions 
include dummy variables for each account's interest rate and dummies for husband and wife 
cash payment selection. Time preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower 
censoring of the discount factors of each spouse and the estimated discount factor of each 
spouse. The demographic control set adds controls for experimental session fixed effects, 
spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of children, and literacy. The economic control 
set adds controls for heterogeneity in income, an indicator for subsistence farmers or the 
unemployed, and phone ownership. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 
percent confidence levels respectively.
Table 6. Preference Heterogeneity, Information Sharing, and Use of Dominated Individual 
Accounts
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Figure 1. Distributions of Estimated Discount Factors and Discount Factor Heterogeneity
Note: Panels A and B are histograms of husbands' and wives' discount factors respectively. Panel C is a weighted scatterplot of husbands' discount 
factors (x axis) and wives' discount factors (y axis). The size of each circle in Panel C is proportional to the number of couples with the relevant 
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Figure 3. Savings Response to Excess Interest Rate by Match Quality and Account Type
Note: Predicted values calculated from regressions with standard errors clustered at the couple level. 
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Figure 4. Use of Dominated Individual Accounts and Heterogeneity in Estimated Discount Factors
Notes: Local linear regression results. The sample is limited to the subset of couples for whom the joint account bears the highest interest 
rate. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating that a couple saved in any individual account. Dashed lines give 95 percent confidence 
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B. Savers With Dominated Individual Accounts
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Figure 5. Interest Rate Losses by Match Quality and Individual Interest Discounting
Notes: Local linear regression results. Dashed lines give 95 percent confidence intervals. Gray 
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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDICES – FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY
A Proofs
Before proving Proposition 1, it is useful to describe the nature of potentially optimal savings
strategies more explicitly. The following two lemmas do this.
Lemma 1 At most one spouse will travel to the bank to transact in a given period.
Proof. The proof will show that any strategy that results in both spouses going to the bank cannot
be optimal. Note that if the second mover saves in account a, she will always save so that u′ (c1) =
RaδBu′ (c2) (and must therefore only be saving at interest rate Ra). Now consider the options of the
first mover.
First suppose the second mover only deposits savings in the joint account. Then the first
mover could simply place additional savings in the joint account to satisfy u′
(









. The second mover will prefer not to go back to the bank, and con-
sumption in both periods will be higher, since at least b in banking costs are saved. This is a
profitable deviation.
Instead suppose the second mover deposits at least some savings in her individual account (this
requires RB ≥ RJ). If RB ≥ RA, the first mover could deviate and simply not go to the bank. The
second mover would continue to save at interest rate RB – since total resources increase by at
least b, the only way u′ (c1) = RaδBu′ (c2) will continue to hold is if consumption in both periods
increases, which is a profitable deviation. Suppose instead that RB < RA. In this case the first
mover could deviate by placing the value of both his and the first mover’s savings, as well as b, in
his individual account. The second mover’s best response to this strategy would be to stay at home
– thus, first period consumption would be unchanged while second period consumption would
strictly increase. This is a profitable deviation.
Combined, these observations show that no strategy in which both spouses go to the bank can
be optimal.
Lemma 2 Consider the case where δA 6= δB. Any pure strategy, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(PSPNE) to the savings game must involve one of the following strategies:
i. Neither spouse saves.
ii. The first mover does not save and the second mover saves in his/her individual account with
RB = Rmax such that u′ (c1) = RmaxδBu′ (c2). This strategy will only be used when RJ < Rmax
and RA < Rmax.
iii. The first mover saves in his/her individual account such that u′ (c1) = RAδAu′ (c2). The
second mover strictly prefers to stay at home. This strategy will only be used when RA ≥ RJ .
iv. The first mover saves in the joint account such that u′ (c1) = RJδAu′ (c2). The second mover
strictly prefers to stay at home. This strategy will only be used when RJ ≥ RA.
v. The first mover saves to the point that the second mover is indifferent between staying home
and going back to the bank to reoptimize savings. When RA > RJ the first mover will only
use his/her individual account. When RJ ≥ RA the first mover may use just the individual
account, just the joint account, or a mixture of the two.
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Proof. The proof will show that any savings strategy other than those listed above cannot be
optimal. First consider strategies in which the second mover saves. By Lemma 1, the first mover
will not go to the bank. It follows that the second mover will make use of the highest return account
available to her. Suppose that both the first and second mover have access to an account bearing
Rmax. In this case the first mover could go to the bank and deposit the second mover’s optimal
savings plus (if δA > δB) or minus (if δA < δB) ε into the high-return account. Since b > 0, the
second mover will prefer to stay at home for sufficiently small ε and the first mover will be strictly
better off. This rules out the possibility that RJ = Rmax, or that RA = RB = Rmax.
Suppose instead that RA = Rmax, but RJ < Rmax, RB < Rmax. Then the first mover could go to
the bank and deposit the value of the second mover’s optimal savings into the high-return indi-
vidual account. The second mover will optimally stay home, first period consumption will stay
unchanged, and second period consumption will strictly increase. Thus, this is a profitable devia-
tion. By process of elimination, case (ii) is the only remaining scenario in which the second mover
saves.
Now consider cases where only the first mover saves. Suppose that the second mover strictly
prefers to stay at home. Then it must be that the first mover is saving in the account with the highest
possible return (call this return R∗ = max {RA,RJ}) such that u′ (c∗1) = R∗δAu′ (c∗2) – otherwise the
first mover could reallocate ε of his savings in such a way to become strictly better off. The only
scenarios satisfying these requirements are (iii) and (iv).
Finally, suppose the first mover saves to the point that the second mover is indifferent between




































is the utility that agent two would get from paying b and reoptimizing savings at
the bank. V2 (·) depends on sA1 , since savings in the first mover’s individual account cannot be
withdrawn by the second mover. In contrast, V2 (·) does not depend on sJ1, since the second mover
can freely access these funds once she is at the bank.
When RA > RJ , the first mover will only use the individual account for an optimal indifference
strategy. To see this, suppose instead that sJ1 > 0. The first mover could simply reallocate joint
savings to his individual account – first period consumption would stay unchanged, second period
consumption would increase, and the second mover would strictly prefer to stay at home. Thus,
the only remaining strategies involving indifference of the second mover are those listed in (v).
We are now prepared to move on to Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose δA = δB. There will be a PSPNE that implements the (c∗1,c
∗
2) that
maximizes both agents’ utility (neither spouse would have an incentive to deviate from the strategy
that generates this allocation). Since we have assumed that couples never play Pareto-dominated
equilibria, it must be the case that L = 0 when a couple is perfectly matched.
2
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that L will never strictly decrease as preference
heterogeneity increases. The proof proceeds by contradiction: suppose that when ∆′ =
∣∣δ ′A−δB∣∣
increases to ∆′′ =
∣∣δ ′′A −δB∣∣ the interest rate loss decreases from L′ > 0 to L′′. Denote the equilib-
rium consumption allocation at ∆′ as (c′1,c
′




































with at least one of the inequalities being strict. (This observation uses the fact that monotonic








A > δB). This implies that the








2). The remainder of the argument
will show that any savings strategy that generates (c′1,c
′
2) cannot be part of a PSPNE.
Since L′ > 0, (c′1,c
′
2) must be generated by the use of at least one account with Ra < Rmax.
Lemma 2 rules out the possibility that the dominated account is that of the second mover, as the
second mover’s account will only be used when RB = Rmax.
A second possibility is that (c′1,c
′
2) is generated by saving only in the dominated joint account.
Lemma 2 shows that the first mover will only save in the joint account when RA ≤ RJ . In this case
it must be that Rmax = RB and (c′′1,c
′′
2) must involve either no saving at all or the second mover








The final possibility is that (c′1,c
′
2) involves the use of the first mover’s dominated individual
account. It must be the case that RJ > RA and (c′′1,c
′′
2) involves use of the joint account – other-
wise (c′′1,c
′′
2) would have to involve either no saving or the second mover saving in her individual
account, which we have seen is impossible. Lemma 2 also shows that the second mover must be








. There are two possibilities
to consider:
i. The second mover is indifferent at (c′1,c
′












First consider subcase (i). If the second mover is not indifferent at (c′′1,c
′′
2), then by Lemma 2
(c′′1,c
′′






























is the utility agent 2 would receive from going back to the bank and reoptimizing
savings given sA
′




– thus, this subcase is not
possible.


































1 . If L
′′ < L′ this must mean that both joint
























2) is not feasible.
Thus, there is no possible scenario in which L′′ < L′. This completes the proof.
B Proxying Banking Costs
I conjecture that those couples who travel to Busia town very frequently for non-bank related
reasons and those couples who have low travel costs to town will have smaller differential banking
costs (i.e. the joint account offers less in transaction cost savings). This should be negatively cor-
related with distance from the bank and economic activity (here I assume that subsistence farmers
and the unemployed are less likely to take frequent trips to town). Moreover, pre-existing use of
a formal savings account should signal lower differential banking costs. Here I include both bank
accounts and SACCO accounts as formal accounts.31 To aggregate these measures, I used princi-
pal components analysis to extract the first principal component of the data matrix formed by the
above-listed variables (results are similar if I convert the measures into standard deviation units
and equally weight them). I then normalized this component to construct a "banking costs index",
which runs from zero (lowest hypothesized banking costs) to one (highest hypothesized banking
costs). Appendix Table B1 checks to see if the cost index is correlated with account behavior
in ways predicted by the theory. The first three columns present couple-level regressions of the
following form:
yc = β0 +β1indexc + x′cδ + εc (2)
where yc is the outcome of interest, indexc is the banking cost index, and xc is a vector of controls.
I use the same control sets as in previous regressions, but I exclude controls for occupation (since
this is included in the index) as well as experimental session fixed effects (which absorb distance
from the bank, which is also included in the index).
It is likely that the cost index is correlated with absolute banking costs and socioeconomic status
in addition to differential banking costs. To test the former hypothesis, the first column of Table B1
examines the correlation between the banking cost index and a dummy variable for whether or not
a couple saved in any bank account. Indeed, couples with the highest proxied costs are significantly
less likely to save in any bank account, which suggests that they have fewer resources and/or face
31SACCO stands for "savings and credit cooperative". SACCOs function like credit unions, and are generally
organized around higher paying professions, such as teaching and commercial farming. There is an argument for
excluding the account ownership variables from the index, since this may be determined in part by match quality. In
practice, the results are very similar if I exclude the account ownership variables from the banking cost index.
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greater costs of using the accounts. The next three columns limit the population to couples who
saved in at least one account, and examine the correlation between use of joint versus individual
accounts and the cost index.32 Higher cost savers are significantly less likely to save individually
and more likely to save jointly as compared to lower cost savers. These results are relatively robust
to adding observable controls that capture socioeconomic status and other characteristics – though
the results examining account use are attenuated upon including economic controls, the coefficients
are still large in magnitude and mostly significant.
Earlier, I argued that well matched couples’ response to (and poorly matched couples’ lack of
response to) the excess interest rate suggest that interest rate losses only impacted the decisions of
well matched savers with relatively low differential banking costs. I use the proxied banking costs
to test this hypothesis directly: in this case well matched couples with low proxied banking costs
should respond robustly to the excess interest rate, while well matched couples with large proxied
banking costs should be much less responsive to the excess rate. To test this, I limit the sample to
well matched couples, define a couple to have high banking costs if their index value is above the
sample median, and run the following regression:
savedac = β0 +β1highc +β2excessac +β3highc× excessac +β4 jointac + (3)





where highc is a dummy variable indicating high banking costs, excessac is the excess interest rate
on account a for couple c, jointac is a joint account indicator, zac is a vector of interest rate dum-
mies, their interactions with jointac, and further interactions with the high cost dummy. Finally, xc
is a vector of the same control sets used in the earlier specifications in Appendix Table B1.
The fourth column of Table B1 presents results of this regression. As expected, the response
to the excess interest rate is positive and highly significant for couples with lower proxied banking
costs and very close to zero for couples with higher proxied banking costs. Overall, these results
suggest that the index is a reasonable proxy for differential banking costs, subject to the caveat that
it is correlated with other determinants of account use, such as socioeconomic status and absolute
banking costs.
32In the absence of a selection effect (i.e. conditional on bJ /savings capacity), larger differential banking costs
will push couples to make more intensive use of joint accounts. However, larger absolute banking costs/lower savings
capacities will select out smaller scale savers. Since the hypothesized costs are fixed and not proportional to balances,
these savers will be more likely to opt for joint accounts, all else equal. Therefore this selection effect would bias me
away from finding a positive correlation between joint account use and the cost index.
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C Extra Statements Sample and Information Index
As described in Section 3, 50 percent of couples (who attended the seventh experimental ses-
sion or above) were sampled for an "extra statements" offer. In order to keep selection into in-
dividual account opening constant between treatment and control, the experimental protocol dic-
tated that the extra statement offer only be made to participants after they decided which accounts
to open. However, extra statement provision is significantly, negatively correlated with the prob-
ability of opening an individual account in the overall sample. The enumerators never reported
informing couples about the extra statements before account choice, nor did they report any cases
where couples changed their minds about opening individual accounts after getting an extra state-
ments offer. However, in a subset of the sessions the enumerators were able to observe couples’
extra statements treatment status before couples made account opening choices. The correlation is
only significant in this subset of sessions, so I conjecture that some enumerators guided selected
couples to joint accounts, as filling out the extra statement cards involved time consuming paper-
work. To address this concern, I ran the following regression among all individual accounts in the
suspect sessions enumerator by enumerator:
openic = β0 +β1esc + γe + εic
Where i indexes the individual, esc indicates extra statement selection and γe are co-enumerator
fixed effects (the enumerators worked in teams of two).
Out of 14 enumerators, the coefficient on esc was negative and significant for just four enu-
merators. I dropped observations for these four enumerators in the sessions where enumerators
could observe extra statement selection prior to the couple’s account opening decision. All told,
I dropped 366 of 1,000 individual account observations. Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table C1
verify that account opening is uncorrelated with extra statement selection once I drop the suspect
enumerators.
Before dropping suspect observations, I created an information sharing index. The index inputs
are responses to baseline survey questions addressing income earned last week, bank accounts,
savings at home, SACCOs, and ROSCAs, which I use to create five subindices. The subindices
range from 0 (perfect information) to 1 (most misinformation). If cross reports exactly matched
own reports, I coded the subindex to 0. If an individual reported that they did (did not) use a device,
but the spouse reported that they did not (did), I coded the subindex to 1. If a spouse asserted that
they did not know if an individual used a given device, or if they did not know how much savings
was in the device, I also coded the subindex to 1. For other instances where I had an own report
and a cross report of the amount (or in the case of ROSCAs, the number of ROSCAs), I coded the
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. I then created a household-level information index equal
to:













where a value of 1 represents a perfectly informed household and a value of 0 represents a poorly
informed household.
Appendix Table C1 presents the results of the extra statements intervention. All regressions are
of the following form:
yac = β0 +β1esc +ht ′cλ + x
′
cδ + εac (4)
where yac is the outcome of interest, esc indicates that the couple was selected for (or, in some
specifications, consented to) extra statements, and xc is a vector of additional controls. To ex-
amine treatment effects by preference heterogeneity and household information sharing, in some
specifications I also include the vector htc, which includes a dummy for poorly matched couples,
a dummy for poorly informed couples, and the interaction of these variables with the extra state-
ments indicator.
The first two columns of Table C1 verify that, as per experimental protocol, the probability of
opening an individual account is uncorrelated with extra statement selection. This is in fact the
case, and for the remaining specifications I limit the sample to opened individual accounts. The
next two specifications examine extra statement consent rates. Panel A, Column 4 reveals substan-
tial differences in consent rates by household information sharing. Poorly informed households
were 28 percentage points less likely to consent to extra statements, though additional controls
reduce the magnitude and significance of this estimate.
Columns 5-8 of Table C1 examine the reduced form impact of the extra statements offer on
savings rates and average daily balances of open individual accounts. The overall impact of extra
statements (columns 5 and 7) is relatively small, insignificant, and actually positive in sign. Given
the low consent rate, this is not very surprising – individuals who would be most adversely im-
pacted by the extra statements should have been most likely to refuse consent. However, columns
6 and 8 suggest that this aggregate zero impact may mask differences by information sharing. In
particular, conditional on demographic and economic characteristics the extra statements interven-
tion reduced savings rates for couples who are both poorly informed and poorly matched (I reject
that the main effect plus the interaction effects for the poorly informed and matched are equal to
zero at the 90 percent level or better in the last two panels). In contrast, there is some evidence
that the extra statements intervention actually had a positive impact on well informed and well
matched couples. It is possible that these couples viewed the extra statements as a commitment de-
vice to stick to cooperative savings plans and were therefore more likely to use their experimental
7
accounts.
D Supplementary Tables and Robustness Checks
Appendix Table D1 summarizes individual level demographic characteristics for well and poorly
matched couples and tests whether characteristics differ by match quality. Appendix Table D2
presents additional randomization verification results. Panel A tests whether the empirical distri-
butions of treatments differ from their theoretical analogs. This panel displays the share of indi-
viduals exposed to each treatment and the p-value from a binomial test that this share is equal to
the theoretically expected share. Panel B tests whether treatments are correlated with one another.
Each column corresponds to a regression where the treatment of interest is regressed on all other
treatments.
Appendix Table D3 verifies that respondents understood and responded to the experimental
interest rates. This table displays the results of account level regressions of the outcome of interest
on interest rate dummy variables, a joint account dummy, and dummy variables for husband and
wife cash payment selection.
Appendix Tables D4-D6 test the robustness of the main results to (1) alternative measures of
preference heterogeneity, (2) including additional controls, and (3) alternative samples. Table D4
tests the robustness of the results in Table 2, while Tables D5 and D6 test the robustness of the
results in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
In addition to the main discount factor estimates, I estimate discount factors via nonlinear least
squares with normally distributed errors, and via an ad hoc bounding strategy similar to that in
Meier and Sprenger (2010). Specifically, suppose that for individual i, Ksh X at time t is preferred
to Ksh 300 at time t+τ , but Ksh 300 at time t+τ is preferred to Ksh Y < X at time t. I assume that
the individual is indifferent between Ksh 300 at time t + τ and the midpoint of the two amounts(X+Y
2
)
at time t. I calculate the implied discount factor using this midpoint. I do this for each table
of monetary choices, obtaining 10 discount factor estimates, and take the simple average of them.
The tables also present results using alternative rules of thumb for match quality, where I define
either 1/3 or 2/3 of couples to be “well matched” based on discount factors. Table D5 also presents
results where I use the absolute value of preference heterogeneity, |hetc|, as a measure of match
quality. Finally, the robustness check tables include specifications where I drop all couples who
were randomly selected to receive at least one cash payment, and specifications where I include
controls for information sharing and consumption decision making.
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Appendix Table B1. Proxied Banking Costs and Savings Behavior
Saved Any Saved Indiv. Saved Joint
Panel A. Basic Controls
Cost Index/High Cost -0.381*** -0.870*** 0.582*** -0.170***





Panel B. + Time Preference Controls
Cost Index/High Cost -0.381*** -0.886*** 0.588*** -0.181***





Panel C. + Demographic Controls
Cost Index/High Cost -0.289*** -0.912*** 0.546*** -0.199***





Panel D. + Economic Controls
Cost Index/High Cost -0.326*** -0.789*** 0.348 -0.213***





DV Mean 0.430 0.677 0.358
N 598 257 257
Sample All Savers Savers Well Matched
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the couple level when relevant) in 
parentheses. All regressions include dummies for husband and wife cash payment 
selection. Time preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower 
censoring of the discount factors of each spouse and the estimated discount factor of 
each spouse. The demographic control set adds controls for spousal heterogeneity in 
age, education, number of children, and literacy. The economic control set adds 
controls for heterogeneity in income and phone ownership. The final column includes 
dummy variables that fully saturate interest rate×joint account, as well as a high 
cost×joint account, and interactions between the high cost dummy and the interest 
rate×joint account interaction set. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, 
and 90 percent confidence levels respectively.





Appendix Table C1. Impact of Extra Statements on Savings and Average Balances of Individual Accounts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. Basic Controls
Extra Statement -0.023 0.043 0.579*** 0.765*** 0.037 0.191* 230 529 0.065 0.280 397 805
(0.052) (0.085) (0.067) (0.109) (0.056) (0.105) (180) (451) (0.097) (0.171) (312) (700)
   x Poorly Matched -0.043 -0.129 -0.151 -362 -0.248 -682
(0.104) (0.137) (0.111) (335) (0.238) (674)
   x Poorly Informed -0.056 -0.280* -0.187 -155 -0.342 -20.5
(0.115) (0.145) (0.123) (415) (0.254) (772)
Panel B. + Time Preference Controls
Extra Statement -0.030 0.038 0.560*** 0.758*** 0.055 0.193* 280 548 0.098 0.253 500 774
(0.054) (0.087) (0.066) (0.111) (0.054) (0.102) (182) (462) (0.097) (0.162) (327) (706)
   x Poorly Matched -0.039 -0.169 -0.093 -141 -0.113 -175
(0.106) (0.135) (0.109) (337) (0.242) (735)
   x Poorly Informed -0.059 -0.252* -0.219* -297 -0.382 -264
(0.116) (0.148) (0.129) (441) (0.252) (773)
Panel C. + Demographic Controls
Extra Statement -0.012 0.017 0.587*** 0.798*** 0.047 0.158* 155 1031** 0.081 0.160 264 1410**
(0.054) (0.095) (0.063) (0.096) (0.050) (0.095) (120) (461) (0.087) (0.135) (206) (637)
   x Poorly Matched -0.019 -0.224* -0.147 -755** -0.267 -1669*
(0.110) (0.123) (0.115) (379) (0.231) (870)
   x Poorly Informed -0.003 -0.153 -0.244* -948* -0.371* -1330*
(0.133) (0.137) (0.138) (555) (0.209) (798)
Panel D. + Economic Controls
Extra Statement -0.009 0.024 0.593*** 0.732*** -0.007 0.070 81.6 1007** -0.011 0.053 138 1468**
(0.055) (0.098) (0.061) (0.107) (0.056) (0.097) (151) (441) (0.094) (0.149) (254) (643)
   x Poorly Matched -0.018 -0.147 -0.143 -828*** -0.366 -2013***
(0.112) (0.141) (0.123) (301) (0.232) (834)
   x Poorly Informed 0.020 -0.107 -0.294** -862* -0.509** -1452*





Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses. All regressions except for columns (1) and (2) limited to open individual accounts. 
All regressions include dummies for husband and wife cash payment selection. Time preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower censoring 
of the discount factors of each spouse and the estimated discount factor of each spouse. The demographic control set adds controls for experimental session 
fixed effects, spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of children, and literacy. The economic control set adds controls for heterogeneity in income, 
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Appendix Table D1. Demographic Characteristics of Study Sample by Match Quality
Well Matched Badly Matched Difference N
Age 38.4 38.6 -0.211 1196
[13.2] [12.7] (0.748)
Education 7.01 6.98 0.025 1191
[4.00] [3.90] (0.229)
Literate 0.753 0.781 -0.028 1196
[0.432] [0.414] (0.024)
Number Children 4.61 4.72 -0.109 1196
[2.76] [2.73] (0.159)
Subsistence Farmer/No Job 0.416 0.457 -0.041 1191
[0.493] [0.499] (0.029)
Income Last Week 1044 1101 -56.8 1164
[1936] [2564] (133)
Owns Mobile Phone 0.497 0.415 0.083*** 1191
[0.500] [0.493] (0.029)
Participates in ROSCA 0.582 0.567 0.015 1196
[0.494] [0.496] (0.029)
Has Bank Account 0.227 0.194 0.033 1196
[0.420] [0.396] (0.024)
Has a SACCO Account 0.039 0.034 0.005 1193
[0.193] [0.180] (0.011)
Saves at Home 0.889 0.860 0.030 1195
[0.314] [0.348] (0.019)
Has Mobile Money Account 0.207 0.234 -0.026 998
[0.406] [0.424] (0.026)
Saves Other Ways 0.608 0.511 0.097*** 998
[0.489] [0.500] (0.031)
Total Reported Savings 14261 10768 3493 923
[53389] [25265] (2766)
Consumption - Husband Decides 0.396 0.452 -0.056** 1189
[0.489] [0.498] (0.029)
Consumption - Wife Decides 0.131 0.114 0.017 1189
[0.338] [0.318] (0.019)
Consumption - Both Decide 0.418 0.397 0.021 1189
[0.494] [0.490] (0.029)
Savings - Husband Decides 0.324 0.312 0.012 1189
[0.468] [0.464] (0.027)
Savings - Wife Decides 0.471 0.459 0.013 1189
[0.500] [0.499] (0.029)
Savings - Both Decide 0.178 0.209 -0.031 1189
[0.383] [0.407] (0.023)
Distance from Bank (Miles) 3.97 3.59 0.378*** 1196
[2.16] [2.24] (0.127)
Weekly Discount Factor 0.844 0.579 0.265*** 1196
[0.274] [0.396] (0.020)
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets, standard errors in parentheses. Mobile money and other savings 
data not available for the 98 couples in the first 6 experimental sessions. Variable recoded to missing if 
response was don't know/refused. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent 
confidence levels respectively.
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Appendix Table D2. Additional Randomization Verification











10% Interest Rate/Extra Stmts/Cash 0.232 0.239 0.319 0.456* 0.175**
{0.345} {0.571} {0.488} {0.054} {0.030}
6% Interest Rate 0.242 0.264 0.355
{0.706} {0.422} {0.278}
2% Interest Rate 0.256 0.266 0.326
{0.741} {0.370} {0.729}
0% Interest Rate 0.269 0.231
{0.278} {0.299}











Excess Interest - Husband's Account -0.736*** -0.714*** -0.001 0.002
(0.024) (0.022) (0.008) (0.004)
Excess Interest - Wife's Account -0.811*** -0.767*** -0.003 0.001
(0.025) (0.021) (0.008) (0.004)
Excess Interest - Joint Account -0.917*** -0.894*** 0.001 0.003
(0.021) (0.019) (0.009) (0.004)
Extra Statements -0.035 -0.075 0.015 -0.014
(0.249) (0.237) (0.221) (0.023)
Cash Payment 0.115 0.070 0.127 -0.026
(0.204) (0.196) (0.178) (0.040)
N 1196 1196 1196 1000 1196
Excess Interest Rate on:
Level Interest Rate on:
Notes: Panel A shows the proportion of the sample selected for each treatment, as well as p-values (in 
braces) from binomial tests that the realized proportion is equal to the theoretical proportion. 
Theoretical probabilities are 1/4 for the first two columns, 1/3 for the third column, 1/2 for the fourth 
column, and 1/5 for the final column. Each column in panel B presents results of regressing the 
treatment of interest (column heading) on the remaining treatments. Regressions in columns 1-4 include 
an additional dummy variable for couples who were not eligible for the extra statements treatment. 
Standard errors clustered at the couple level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence levels respectively.
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Panel A. All Accounts Offered to All Couples
2% Interest 0.063* 0.010 0.023 9.11
(0.035) (0.021) (0.085) (37.7)
6% Interest 0.143*** 0.065*** 0.034 60.6
(0.035) (0.021) (0.081) (51.1)
10% Interest 0.209*** 0.094*** 0.305*** 119**
(0.037) (0.022) (0.104) (51.7)
Joint 0.262*** 0.190*** 0.433*** 120***
(0.037) (0.024) (0.095) (46.6)
DV Mean (Omitted) 0.288 0.054 0.164 49.9
N 1794 1794 1794 1794
Panel B. All Accounts Offered to Well Matched Couples
2% Interest 0.032 0.015 0.009 27.6
(0.047) (0.026) (0.123) (38.8)
6% Interest 0.134*** 0.065*** -0.027 99.8
(0.050) (0.027) (0.105) (75.4)
10% Interest 0.225*** 0.122*** 0.288** 191***
(0.050) (0.031) (0.142) (67.2)
Joint 0.287*** 0.213*** 0.463*** 95.6
(0.052) (0.033) (0.115) (71.6)
DV Mean (Omitted) 0.288 0.033 0.144 20.1
N 897 897 897 897
Panel C. All Accounts Offered to Poorly Matched Couples
2% Interest 0.094* 0.004 0.037 -10.3
(0.051) (0.032) (0.118) (64.8)
6% Interest 0.152*** 0.062* 0.101 21.0
(0.050) (0.032) (0.122) (70.0)
10% Interest 0.194*** 0.065** 0.324** 49.4
(0.054) (0.031) (0.151) (80.6)
Joint 0.239*** 0.167*** 0.403*** 145***
(0.053) (0.034) (0.151) (60.9)
DV Mean (Omitted) 0.288 0.075 0.185 81.0
N 897 897 897 897
Notes: Omitted group is individual accounts, zero percent interest. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses. All regressions include 
separate dummies for husband and wife cash payment selection. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence levels respectively.
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Panel A. Well Matched Couples Only
Excess Low×Indiv -0.012 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.007 -0.003 -0.006
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Excess High×Indiv 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016* 0.015*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Excess Low×Joint 0.005 0.013 0.012 0.002 0.019 0.020 0.017
(0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Excess High×Joint 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.011 0.013 0.005 0.005
(0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
DV Mean 0.161 0.162 0.164 0.163 0.092 0.164 0.164
N 597 1197 897 897 588 897 897
Panel B. Poorly Matched Couples Only
Excess Low×Indiv -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Excess High×Indiv 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Excess Low×Joint -0.002 0.021 0.005 0.004 -0.037*** -0.006 -0.005
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Excess High×Joint 0.008 -0.041*** -0.021* -0.009 -0.005 -0.017 -0.017
(0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
DV Mean 0.174 0.184 0.175 0.176 0.107 0.175 0.175
N 1197 597 897 897 618 897 897
Panel C. Allowing for Heterogeneity Across Demographic Controls
  Well Matched Couples
Excess Positive 0.013 0.014** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.015** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Excess Zero -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 -0.008 0.005 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
  Poorly Matched Couples
Excess Positive 0.015* 0.001 -0.023** -0.016 -0.003 -0.022** -0.010
(0.008) (0.028) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Excess Zero -0.010 -0.053*** -0.013 0.000 -0.021*** -0.013 -0.009
(0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
  Tests of Equality of Coefficients Across Equations
Excess Positive {0.883} {0.651} {0.001}***{0.010}*** {0.104} {0.000}*** {0.010}**
Excess Zero {0.479} {0.001}*** {0.293} {0.694} {0.107} {0.109} {0.253}
















Appendix Table D4. Robustness Checks - Responses to the Excess Interest Rate by Match Quality
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses, p-values in braces. All 
specifications include fixed effects that saturate interest rate×joint account and dummies for husband and 
wife cash payment selection, as well as the time preference, demographic, and economic control sets 
described in Table 5. The information sharing specification also includes a dummy for well informed 
households. The consumption decision making controls in column 7 include dummy variables for individual 
reports of whether the husband decides, the wife decides, both decide together, both decide independently, or 
someone else decides, as well as interactions between husband and wife reports. All controls are demeaned to 
the value among well matched couples. Specifications in Panel C also include interactions between the 
excess interest splines and the included control variables. Cross-equation F-tests performed using seemingly 





Panel A. Logit NLLS, Well Matched - 33%
Poorly Matched 0.159*** 0.233
(0.041) (0.203)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.050 0.118
Panel B. Logit NLLS, Well Matched - 67%
Poorly Matched 0.130*** 0.175
(0.049) (0.201)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.097 0.230
Panel C.Probit NLLS, Well Matched - 50%
Poorly Matched 0.155*** 0.193
(0.048) (0.193)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.082 0.195
Panel D. Ad Hoc Discount Factors, Well Matched - 50%
Poorly Matched 0.175*** 0.280*
(0.042) (0.148)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.079 0.184
Panel E. Absolute Value Preference Heterogeneity
Absolute Value of Heterogeneity 0.251*** 0.388
(0.066) (0.264)
DV Mean (All) 0.132 0.306
Panel F. Drop Cash Payment Recipients
Poorly Matched 0.068** 0.248**
(0.032) (0.115)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.036 0.167
Panel G. Control for Consumption Decision Making
Poorly Matched 0.166*** 0.308
(0.048) (0.189)
DV Mean (Well Matched) 0.078 0.182
Appendix Table D5. Robustness Checks - Preference Heterogeneity and Account Use
Couples with Dominated Individual Account
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample size is N=363 and 
N=157 for columns 1 and 2 respectively, expect for Panel F, which has sample sizes of 
N=238 and N=57 respectively. All regressions include time preference, demographic, and 
economic controls sets except Panel F. This panel only includes the time preference control 
set because the small sample size cannot support larger control sets in the "savers only" 
specification. See notes to Table 3 for time preference, demographic, and economic control 
sets. The consumption decision making controls in Panel G include dummy variables for 
individual reports of whether the husband decides, the wife decides, both decide together, 
both decide independently, or someone else decides, as well as interactions between 
husband and wife reports.  All regressions include dummy variables for each account's 
interest rate and dummies for husband and wife cash payment selection. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence levels respectively. 
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Appendix Table D6. Robustness Checks - Interest Rate Losses by Match Quality (No Individual Interest Discounting)





Maximum Interest Earnings 8.15 8.07 8.29 8.18 8.11 8.04
Actual Interest Earnings 7.10 7.08 7.32 7.18 7.12 7.07
Loss 1.05 0.982 0.973 1.00 0.998 1.11
Well Matched Couples
Maximum Interest Earnings 8.17 8.35 8.10 8.14 8.21 8.12
Actual Interest Earnings 7.50 7.74 7.29 7.43 7.49 7.26
Loss 0.664 0.610 0.801 0.713 0.719 0.960
Loss Gap
A. No Controls 0.389** 0.372** 0.172 0.291* 0.279 0.315*
(0.172) (0.167) (0.188) (0.172) (0.172) (0.168)
B. + Interest Rate/Cash Prize Controls 0.541*** 0.486*** 0.311* 0.394*** 0.450*** 0.366**
(0.157) (0.154) (0.179) (0.159) (0.162) (0.168)
C. + Time Preference Controls 0.508*** 0.481*** 0.103 0.309 0.375** 0.265
(0.211) (0.180) (0.240) (0.206) (0.190) (0.286)
D. + Demographic Controls 0.486*** 0.452*** 0.087 0.363* 0.412** 0.248
(0.208) (0.177) (0.249) (0.203) (0.189) (0.303)
E. + Economic Controls 0.486** 0.440*** 0.101 0.365* 0.415** 0.268
(0.213) (0.181) (0.252) (0.208) (0.193) (0.318)
F. + Information Sharing Controls 0.481** 0.433*** 0.095 0.356* 0.404** 0.279
(0.215) (0.181) (0.251) (0.209) (0.192) (0.325)
G. + Decision Making Controls 0.477** 0.379** 0.098 0.356 0.391** 0.242
(0.220) (0.187) (0.258) (0.217) (0.196) (0.320)
N 598 598 598 598 598 402
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Interest rate controls include a set of dummy variables that fully saturate the set 
of experimental interest rates and dummies for husband and wife cash payment selection. See notes to Table 7 for time 
preference, demographic, and economic control sets. The information sharing control set includes a dummy for well informed 
households. The consumption decision making controls include dummy variables for individual reports of whether the 
husband decides, the wife decides, both decide together, both decide independently, or someone else decides, as well as 
interactions between husband and wife reports. Proxied banking costs constructed using a principal components index of 
distance from the bank, spouse specific indicators for subsistence farmers/the unemployed, and spouse specific indicators for 
baseline bank account ownership and SACCO membership. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent 
confidence levels respectively. 
16
Appendix Figure D1. Interest Rate Design
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Notes: The first number in interior cells is the excess interest rate on the joint account. The excess interest rate on the husband's and wife's 
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